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Abstract
The aim of this article is to trace the evolution in the meaning of the concept of Sunnah 
prior to its classical definition, which largely confluences it with the concept of an authentic 
( sạḥīḥ) Ḥadīth as defined by the classical Ḥadīth sciences. This article will first describe the 
semanico-contextual changes in the meaning of the term Sunnah during the period under 
examination and then present a chronological analysis of the development of the concept 
‘Sunnah’ in relation to the development of the concept ‘authentic Ḥadīth’. This article 
argues that during the first four generations of Muslims, the concept ‘Sunnah’ remained 
epistemologically independent of the concept ‘authentic Ḥadīth’ and that evaluation of 
Sunnah compliance with a certain practice or belief remained methodologically independent 
to that of the concept of an authentic Ḥadīth, as defined by classical ʿulūm al-ḥadīth 
sciences.
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1. Introduction
Throughout Islamic historical experience, the Sunnah, alongside the 
Qurʾān, has been considered to be one of the primary sources of Islamic 
* E-mail: adisduderija@gmail.com.
1 The word ‘recent’ in the title of this article refers primarily to works written by both 
Muslim and non-Muslim scholars in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
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Law.2 The need for Sunnah as a source of Islamic Law stems from the 
actual nature of the Qurʾānic Revelation itself and the role played by the 
Prophet Muhammad in the “Prophetic-Revelatory event” to borrow 
Graham’s phrase.3 By the term ‘nature of the Qurʾānic revelation’ one 
means its Deutungsbeduerftigkeit, i.e., its need for interpretation and, more 
specifically in the context of Islamic Law, its limited usefulness for the 
purposes of establishing a comprehensive and systematic socio-political 
and legal system.4 Traditionally it found its expression in the maxim: 
al-qurʾān ahwaj ilā s-sunnah min al-sunnah ilā l-qurʾān (i.e. the Qurʾān is 
in need of Sunnah more than Sunnah is in need of the Qurʾān).5
In order to fill the Qurʾānic gap, the early Muslim community took 
recourse to the concept Sunnah, a pre-Qurʾānic tribal custom signifying 
emulation-worthiness of a certain individual whose conduct becomes a 
norm for others to follow. This was based on the premise that Prophet 
Muhammad’s embodiment of the Qurʾānic Message, that took place in a 
variety of contexts over a period of more than 20 years during his Prophet-
hood, is to be considered the most authoritative model for subsequent 
generations of Muslim to follow as well as its having normative value for 
the setting of legal antecedents and law explication purposes.6
2 Few Muslim groups, such as the nineteenth and twentieth century Ahl al-Qurʾān 
groups in the Sub-continent or contemporary Qurʾān alone proponents, have rejected the 
concept of Sunnah as being normative because of their rejection of Ḥadīth. In their minds 
these two concepts, according to classical Islamic scholarship, were conceptually identical. 
Hence the rejection of the concept of Sunnah as a source of Islamic Law. See D. Brown, 
Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996) 38-39.
3 W.A. Graham, Divine Word and Prophetic Word in Early Islam—Reconsideration of the 
Sources, with Special References to the Divine Saying or Ḥadīth Qudsi (The Hague: Mouton, 
1977).
4 This notion of comprehensibility of Islam (shumuliyyat al-islām) is based upon the 
classical Islamic doctrine according to which Islam as a worldview touches all dimensions 
of human existence at both the individual and social levels. For a brief and useful discussion 
of the issue of shumuliyyat al-islām, see, e.g., Ramadan, The Western Muslims and the Future 
of  Western Islam (Oxford: Oneworld, 2004) 33-37. On the limited usefulness of the Qurʾān 
for the development of comprehensive legal doctrine, see, e.g., W. Hallaq, A History of 
Islamic Legal Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 3-15.
5 Abū Muhammad al-Barbahari, Sharh al-Sunnah, Khalid al-Raddadi, ed. (Beirut: Dār 
al-Sumayʾī, 2000) 71.
6 See Z.I. Ansari, “The Contribution of the Qurʾān and the Prophet to the Development 
of the Islamic Fiqh”, Journal of Islamic Studies, 3/2 (1992) 141-171.
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Therefore, the concept Sunnah is overall very significant in Islamic 
thought and forms a basis for a large segment of Islamic law and theology. 
Moreover, as the author has argued elsewhere,7 differences in the evalua-
tion of Sunnah compliance with certain practices and beliefs has been 
responsible for the emergence of conflicting views on a variety of issues 
pertaining to both the realms of Islamic jurisprudence and belief, while all 
claiming to be firmly rooted in the Qurʾān and Sunnah/Ḥadīth.
As described below, the classical concept of Sunnah has been defined in 
a way that renders it hermeneutically completely dependent upon the body 
of Ḥadīth literature. In this article, we refer to this definition of Sunnah as 
Ḥadīth-dependent Sunnah.
This article attempts to answer the following questions.
•  Does the traditional definition of Sunnah that took root and estab-
lished itself during the post-formative or classical period8 of Islamic 
thought9 reflect the way this term was understood during the pre-
classical period?
•  If not, as this article argues, how did this classical definition of Sunnah 
emerge and which mechanisms were responsible for its conflation 
with an authentic Ḥadīth as defined by the classical ʿulūm al-ḥadīth 
sciences and when did they become apparent?
As such the aim of this article is to outline a chronological analysis of the 
development of the Sunnah concept and, in particular, how long it 
7 A. Duderija, “Toward a Methodology of the Nature and the Concept of Sunnah”, Arab 
Law Quarterly, 21/3 (2007) 269-280; cf., A. Duderija, “Paradigm Shift in Assessing/
Evaluating the Value and Significance of Ḥadīth in Islamic Thought: From ʿulūm ul-ḥadīth 
to usụ̄l ul-fiqh”, Arab Law Quarterly, forthcoming. In the first quoted article I argue that the 
way the nature and scope of the concept of Sunnah is understood or defined is inextricably 
linked with the way the nature, objectives and character of Qurʾānic Revelation is 
conceptualised. Additionally, the article argues that apart from its ʿamal or practice-based 
component, Sunnah comprises akhlaq, fiqh, ʿaqidah and ʿibadah elements which are 
epistemologically and methodologically independent of Ḥadīth but organically linked to a 
particular type of Qurʾānic hermeneutics.
8 The terms post-formative and classical will be used interchangeably throughout this 
article.
9 Here defined as post-fourth generation of Muslims or approximately the first 250 years 
of the Islamic calendar. For more on the definition of formative period of Islamic thought, 
see, M.W. Watt, Formative Period of Islamic Thought, Reprint, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002) 
1-4.
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remained distinct from its classical definition. In order to do this, we trace 
how the meaning and definition of the Sunnah concept has evolved during 
the first four generations of Muslims and prior to its classical definition 
which confluences it with the concept of an authentic ( sạḥīḥ) Ḥadīth as 
defined by the classical Ḥadīth sciences (ʿulūm al-ḥadīth). This article will 
first describe semanico-contextual changes in the meaning of the term 
Sunnah during the period under examination and then present a chrono-
logical analysis of how the concept has evolved in relation to the develop-
ment of an authentic Ḥadīth defined by the classical Ḥadīth sciences. This 
article argues that, during the first four generations of Muslims, the Sun-
nah concept remained epistemologically independent of that for an 
authentic Ḥadīth and that evaluation of the Sunnah’s compliance with a 
certain practice or belief remained methodologically independent to that 
of an authentic Ḥadīth.
2. The Classical Concept of the Definition of the Sunnah Concept 
According to classical Islamic scholarship, as defined by the muḥadīthūn,10 
the concept Sunnah in terms of its authenticity11 is defined as comprising 
10 Experts on the transmission of Ḥadīth, their compiling, classification and authenticity.
11 A sound Ḥadīth and therefore Sunnah, in its ‘post-Shāfiʿī form (see our discussion in 
the main text below) consisted of a matn (text) and isnād (chain of transmitters), usually 
but not always going back to the Prophet. Muḥadīthūn have formulated an impressively 
elaborate and complex hierarchy of Ḥadīth authenticity but not of their epistemological 
worth which was the task of the fuqahāʾ (usụ̄liyyūn). The evaluation of the soundness of the 
Ḥadīth, a task of the muḥadīthūn, is based upon the ʿadalah/uprightness of the narrators 
founded on certain criteria such as his/her memory and character regardless of their 
epistemological value. The epistemological study of Ḥadīth and Sunnah is primarily studied 
by the fuqahāʾ and the usụ̄liyyūn or the Islamic jurists and legal theorists. This study of 
Ḥadīth/Sunnah is concerned with the number of individual chains of narrations (isnād ) 
ranging from ahad to mutawātir Ḥadīth were a part of the larger concern of fuqahāʾ relating 
to legal methodology (usụ̄l al-fiqh). The mutawātir Ḥadīth are those narrations, which have 
been transmitted by such a large number of people that, according to great majority of 
fuqahāʾ (they yield certain or immediate (darurī) knowledge. It must be noted, however, 
that there is no consensus on either the criteria pertaining to assessment of uprightness of 
narrators (‘ilm al-rijal ), or on how many isnāds constitute and render a narration mutawātir. 
There are indeed very few mutawātir Ḥadīth, including those which (could) relate to law. 
Ahad Ḥadīth, on the other hand, are those narrations, which do not fulfill the mutawātir 
criteria and by default do not yield certain knowledge ( yaqin) as stipulated by the majority 
of Muslim jurists, but only zann or uncertainty and are thus legally not binding and cannot 
be considered as part of ʿaqidah or Islamic creed. Therefore, the fuqahāʾ and usụ̄liyyūn 
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numerous narratives documenting Prophet Muhammad’s deeds ( fiʿl ), 
utterances (qawl ) and spoken approval12 (taqrīr) as embodied in various 
Ḥadīth compendia considered ‘authentic’ according to the standards and 
criteria applied by classical Ḥadīth science criticism (ʿulūm al-ḥadīth).13
The definition of the concept Sunnah has several implications, which 
here we will call Ḥadīth-dependent Sunnah. First, it assumes that the scope 
of Sunnah is epistemologically dependent upon and constrained by Ḥadīth, 
i.e. that it has the same epistemological value as that of each ‘authentic’ 
Ḥadīth and that the Ḥadīth is the sole depository and vehicle for Sunnahic 
perpetuation. Secondly, it assumes that Sunnah is methodologically 
dependent upon the Ḥadīth. Being methodologically dependent on the 
Ḥadīth implies that Sunnah compliance (or otherwise) with certain (legal 
or theological) practices or principles is and can only be determined by 
sifting through numerous narratives reportedly going back to the time of 
the Prophet Muhammad via an authentic chain of narrators (isnād ).
Thirdly, as a corollary to the second premise, coalescing and substituting 
the nature and scope of the concept Sunnah with that of Ḥadīth breaks the 
symbiotic and organic relationship between the concept of the Qurʾān and 
Sunnah as it existed during the first four Islamic generations,14 thus making 
the Qurʾān increasingly more hermeneutically dependent upon the Ḥadīth 
compendia. Fourthly, as a result of the above, the Sunnah’s organic and 
symbiotic relationship with the Qurʾān, termed by Graham as the 
“Prophetic-Revelatory event”, was severed and the Qurʾān’s hermeneutical 
dependence upon Ḥadīth body of knowledge entrenched. Fifthly, the 
Sunnah’s function and purpose, as will be demonstrated below, became 
increasingly positively legalistic.15
methodology of deriving Sunnah is different to that of the muḥadīthūn, and will become 
apparent in the main text below, closer to the way the concept of Sunnah was understood 
during the pre-classical period as they only accept the mutawātir Ḥadīth to constitute 
Sunnah. However the definitions of Sunnah are both the same.
12 Some definitions also include Prophet’s sifāt, that is, his features or physical appearance. 
M.M. Al-Aʾzamī, Studies in Ḥadīth Methodology and Literature (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic 
Book Trust, 2002) 6.
13 H.A.R. Gibb and J.H. Kramers, The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 
2001) 552-554. For an overview of ʿ ulūm al-ḥadīth sciences, see, e.g., H.M. Kamali, Ḥadīth 
Methodology—Authenticity, Compilation, Classification and Criticism of Ḥadīth (Kuala 
Lumpur: Ilmiah Publishers, 2002).
14 As shall be demonstrated below.
15 Rather than being conceptualised primarily as ethico-religious or values-based. 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
261
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
ALQ 26.4_f2_393-438.indd   397 7/20/2012   2:54:04 PM
398 A. Duderija / Arab Law Quarterly 26 (2012) 393-437
Prior to addressing the questions raised above, a brief remark about the 
nature and scope of the concept Sunnah is in order. As we argued elsewhere, 
the pre-classical concept of Sunnah16 was based upon a hermeneutically 
symbiotic relationship with the Qurʾānic discourse as premised upon the 
principle of the Qurʾān’s deutungsbedeurftigkeit. The nature and scope of 
the concept Sunnah, furthermore, constituted four different elements: 
sunnah akhlaqiyyah (ethico-moral or values-based component also based 
on the objective nature of ethical values), sunnah ʿaqidiyyah (theological or 
religious component), sunnah fiqhiyyah (legal component which was a 
reason inclusive and a values-based component that recognised the objective 
nature of ethical values) and sunnah ʿamaliyyah/ibadiyyah (practice-based 
component).17 For the purposes of this article, it is important to keep in 
mind that all these components of the Sunnah can be formulated, preserved 
and transmitted independent of any written documentation. Another 
important consideration to be kept in mind throughout this discussion is 
the fact that, during the entire period under investigation, the production, 
maintenance and perpetuation of knowledge, including nascent sciences 
such as jurisprudence, theology and Qurʾānic commentary, was oral rather 
than written.18 As such the concept Sunnah that was called upon and 
employed throughout this period, as demonstrated below, could and did 
exist independent of written Ḥadīth.
3. Evolution in the Nature and Scope of the Concepts Sunnah and 
Ḥadīth
Section 3 presents how the concept Sunnah has evolved vis-à-vis the 
development of what constitutes an ‘authentic’ Ḥadīth from the time 
of the Prophet until the middle of the third century Hijrah when the 
Ḥadīth-based Sunnah gained wide acceptance among Muslim jurists and 
16 Duderija, “Methodology”, supra note 7, pp. 269-280.
17 Some evidence which confirms these assertions will be presented on pp. 8-9. For 
more, see Duderija, “Methodology”, supra note 7. The ʿamaliyyah component could also 
include the administrative and/or political aspects of Sunnah highlighted by Mathnee. Sun-
nah ahlaqiyyah could also be inclusive of the political aspect of Sunnah as political discourse 
relies on principals and values. See M.S. Mathnee, Critical Reading of Fazrul Rahman’s 
Islamic Methodology in History, M.A. Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2005.
18 See A. Souaiaia, The Function of Orality in Islamic Law and Practices—Verbalising 
Meaning, (Londen: Edwin Meller Press, 2006).
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theologians. The analysis first investigates semantico-contextual and there-
after epistemologico-methodological changes in the concept Sunnah. 
3.1. Semantico-contextual Changes in Definition and Scope of the Sunnah 
Ansari has pointed out several difficulties one encounters when studying 
the terminology used during the early period of Islamic thought. One such 
problem is the “comparative lack of fixity in technical connotations of 
terms in use”19 which resulted in a gradual change in connotation over a 
period of time. An important aspect in these semantical changes in 
terminology is their increasing ‘technical’, or what the author would 
describe as legalistic,20 connotations. Moreover, and importantly, these 
terms had a multiplicity of meanings even when employed by the same 
author in the same work.21
Another important principle for the purpose of this study that Ansari 
has identified with reference to the changes in meaning of certain words 
and concepts is the notion of a significant time gap between the usages of 
the conceptual and technical/legalistic aspects of terminology. Put 
differently, words prior to acquiring “standard technical phraseology” had 
other meanings and were used in other contexts.22 The above distinctions 
are of fundamental importance to this study from the point of view of 
understanding the validity of the classical definition of the concept 
Sunnah.
We now will examine the semantico-contextual changes of the concept 
Sunnah. The term will be analysed by examining its etymological (pre-
Qurʾānic) meaning(s), Qurʾānic meaning(s) and post-Qurʾānic usage(s).
19 Z.I. Ansari, “Islamic Juristic Terminology before Shāfiʿī: A Semantical Analysis with 
Special Reference to Kufa”, Arabica, xix (1972) 279.
20 In the sense of as they are being used in literature on Islamic jurispurudence ( fiqh) 
and legal theory (usụ̄l ul-fiqh). For the difference between fiqh and usụ̄l ul-fiqh, see, e.g., 
H. Kamali, “Introduction”, in: The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
21 Ansari, supra note 19, p. 270.
22 This suggests that their definition was imprecise and ambiguous, probably because 
these terms as concepts were quite broad and abstract in nature and were associated with 
ethico-moral values rather than specified edified rules/laws or dogma. We shall explore this 
in subsequent parts of this article.
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3.1.1. Etymological, Qurʾānic and post-Qurʾānic meanings of Sunnah
Etymologically, the term Sunnah underwent several semantic changes.23 It 
originated from the Arabic root S-N-N that probably referred to “flow and 
continuity of a thing with ease and smoothness”.24 Over time, the term 
Sunnah was increasingly used in the context of human behaviour, and as 
“a way, course, rule, mode or manner of acting or conducting life of life”, 
thus becoming equivalent to the word sira. Thereafter it evolved to signify 
moral appropriateness and normativeness of a human worthy of being 
followed.25 Ibn Manzur defines Sunnah as a “commendable straight-
forward manner of conducting oneself (al-sunnat al-tariqat al-maḥmudat 
al-mustaqimah).26 By its very nature it implies normativeness, i.e. having a 
normative character.
With respect to the Qurʾān, the Sunnah has been used on numerous 
occasions with regard to the immutable laws of the retribution of God 
(sunnahāt allāh) with respect to people who repeatedly transgressed these 
laws with disdain.27 The phrase sunnahāt al-awwalīn refers to the ancient 
people or nations who, having brought upon themselves the wrath of God 
by rejecting and killing His Messengers, were doomed and turned to dust.28 
Interestingly the term Sunnah of the Messenger of Allāh (sunnahāt 
un-nabi), a fundamental concept in post-Qurʾānic Islamic thought, does 
not occur in the Qurʾān. The Prophet is, however, praised in the Qurʾān as 
“uswah al- ḥasanah” (a good/beautiful/excellent example) for Muslims.29 
Ansari aptly remarks that this use of the term is consistent with the overall 
Qurʾānic attitude towards all other Prophets.
23 In “Islamic Terminology” Ansari deals with them in more detail; see supra note 19, 
p. 270; cf., I. Ahmed, The Significance of Sunnah and Ḥadīth and their Early Documentation, 
Edinburgh University, Ph.D. Thesis, 1974, pp. 6-11.
24 Ibn Faris, Muʾjam Maqayis al-Luga (1368 AH), Abd al-Salam (ed.), Muhammad 
Harun, 6 vol., Cairo, vol. III, p. 60 ff.
25 Ansari, supra note 19, pp. 260-261: cf., Mathnee, supra note 17, pp. 10-11; cf., 
M.Y. Guraya, The Concept of Sunnah in the Muwatṭạ of Mālik b. Anas, McGill University, 
unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1969, Ch. 1. On the Qurʾānic concept of Sunnah, see also 
R. Gwynne, “The Neglected Sunnah: Sunnat Allāh (The Sunnah of God)”, American 
Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 10/4 (1993) 455-463.
26 Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-ʿArab, 15 vol., Beirut, 1956, vol. 8, p. 226.
27 See, e.g., Qurʾān 40:85; 48:23; 33:38. For all the Qurʾānic usages of Sunnah, see 
H.E. Kassis, A Concordance of the Qurʾān (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 
1983) 1097. Other meanings given are institution, customary action, wont.
28 Qurʾān 7:38; 40:18:55, etc.
29 Qurʾān 60:4.
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Considering the status and authority that the Prophet enjoyed by his 
followers, especially in the Medinian period, and the etymological back-
ground of the word Sunnah as just described, it would be only common-
sense to maintain that the expression “Sunnah of the Prophet” would have 
been used in the early Muslim community in the sense of being Qurʾānically 
sanctioned model-behaviour of the Prophet.30 Furthermore, there is suffi-
cient evidence to suggest that the Prophet himself, the early caliphs such as 
ʿUmar (d. 23 AH), Uthman (d. 35 AH) and Ali (d. 40 AH), as well as the 
people at the time of early Umayyad caliphs (e.g., Abd al-Mālik, 65-86 
AH), used this sunnah al-nabi (Prophet’s Sunnah) expression on numerous 
occasions.31
Apart from its usage in a phrase sunnah al-nabi in the first and especially 
second half of the first century Hijrah, the word Sunnah has been used in 
the following ways. Sunnah refers to the “right and just practice” of the 
Prophet,32 Sunnah of caliphs preceding Uthman (i.e., Abu Bakr and 
Umar);33 Sunnah of believers;34 Sunnah as a norm to be followed in juris-
prudential sense;35 and Sunnah as distinct from Ḥadīth.36
Although still quite general and vague at the beginning of the second 
century, the term Sunnah, with the rise of sciences of jurisprudence (usụ̄l 
al-fiqh), was being increasingly but not exclusively used in a legal 
sense.37Ansari gives us following Sunnah meanings from that period in 
time: obedience and loyalty of the people to the ruling government in 
accordance with the book (Qurʾān) and Sunnah;38 emphasis on the Sun-
nah as something that can be traced back to the time of the Prophet and/
or early caliphs (in contrast to just any practice adopted by the people);39 
Sunnah becoming a synonym of the expression Sunnah of the Prophet;40 
30 Ahmed, supra note 23, pp. 32-43.
31 Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad, vol. II, p. 124, as cited in Ansari, supra note 19, pp. 263-264.
32 Crone and Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 71.
33 Ansari, supra note 19, p. 264.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., p. 268.
36 I. Goldziher, Muhammedanische Studien (1889-1890), Halle, vol. II, p. 12.
37 I.e., principles and practices of the Prophet implying normativeness and was being 
restricted to the persona of the Prophet himself only.
38 Ansari, supra note 19, p. 265.
39 Ibid., p. 266.
40 Ibid., p. 267.
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Sunnah as practice based on ijmāʿ;41 Sunnah as a rule;42 Sunnah as exten-
sion of the Qurʾān;43 Sunnah as well-established norms/practises (ʿamal ) 
recognised by Muslims in general, which came through and were accepted 
by learned scholars ( fuqahāʾ )44 and the Sunnah as antonym for heretical 
innovation (bid ʿah).45 Juynboll offers several other contexts in which the 
term Sunnah was associated and used during the second century Hijrah, 
namely, as a politico-administrative term with a religious flavour,46 Sunnah 
as a general righteous Islamic practice (as-sunnah al-ʿadilah; jarat al-
sunnah),47 Sunnah as a normative way of the early community as a whole.48 
Abd Allah’s extensive analysis of Mālik Ibn Anas’ concept ʿamal leads him 
to conclude that he used the word Sunnah in a numner of ways: that of 
Sunnah supported by the Medinian ijmāʿ (sunna l-lā-ladhi lā ikhtilah fiha 
ʿindana); Sunnah being put into practice (madat al-sunna); Sunnah of all 
Muslims (sunnat al-muslimīn); Sunnah known to the people of knowledge 
(sunnah ʿindanah); Sunnah of the Prophet (sunnat al-nabi) and simply 
Sunnah (al-sunnah).49
In his book On Schacht’s Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, Al-
Azami also gives textual evidence that the word Sunnah was used “in a 
variety of different contexts”.50
Dutton’s studies of Mālik’s Muwatṭạ lead him to conclude that accord-
ing to Mālik the concept Sunnah was seen as:
. . . a normative practice established by the Prophet, put into practice by Companions 
and inherited from them as ʿamal (in this sense the practice of Companions in Med-
ina) by the Successors and their Successors up to the time of Mālik.51
41 Ibid., p. 269.
42 Ibid., p. 270.
43 Ibid., p. 272.
44 Ibid., p. 274
45 Brown, supra note 2, p. 11.
46 G.H.A. Juynboll, “Some New Ideas on the Development of Sunnah as a Technical 
Term in Early Islam”, in: G.H.A. Juynboll (ed.), Studies on the Origins and Uses of Islamic 
Ḥadīth, (Ashgate: Variorum, 1996) 103.
47 Ibid., pp. 103-104.
48 Ibid., p. 104.
49 Umar Faruq Abd-Allah, Mālik’s Concept of ‘Amal in the Light of Mālikī Legal Theory, 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1978, vol. I, pp. 549-550; cf., Guraya, supra note 25.
50 Al-Azami, On Schacht’s Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, (Riyadh: King Saud 
University, 1985) 32. 
51 Y. Dutton, The Origins of Islamic Law—The Qurʾān, the Muwatṭạ and Madinian 
ʿAmal, (Londen: Routledge Curzon, 2002) 168. 
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A somewhat different and more nuanced understanding of the concept of 
Sunnah in Mālik’s Muwatṭạ that is still independent of Ḥadīth is argued by 
Guraya who defines it as a concept based on “recognized Islamic religious 
norms and accepted standards of conduct derived from the religious and 
ethical principles introduced by the Prophet”.52 Importantly, Guraya also 
identifies Sunnah’ constituents which shall be discussed subsequently.
Another definition of Sunnah that does not depend upon its written-
based documentation is argued by Pakistani scholars Moiz Amjad and 
Ghamidi. They define Sunnah as: “a set of actions or practical rules (exclud-
ing beliefs) which Prophet initiated promoted and performed among all of 
his followers as a part of God’s religion (dīn) and that have been perpetu-
ated from one generation to another practically”.53
Ansari echoes these words by stating that at the time of the famous 
Syrian scholar Awzaʾi (d. 157 AH) “the ways of referring to Sunnah, [how-
ever] were not standardised”.54 Similarly Wheeler in his investigation of 
second-century jurists such as Ibrahim (d. 182 AH) and Anas (d. 179 AH) 
maintains that the “concept and content of Sunnah was malleable because 
it was not yet to be limited to a textual corpus”.55
It is worth noting the words by Al-Azami in the same section of the 
book dealing with the early concept of Sunnah, which serves here as a 
means of a brief summary of what was said above with regards to semantico-
contextual changes in the Sunnah: “Not only was the word Sunnah origi-
nally not confined to the practices of the Prophet: its meaning also 
underwent changes”.56
From the above discussion it can be established that the concept Sunnah 
underwent a series of semanico-contextual changes during the formative 
period of Islamic thought. The question that arises is why did the concept 
Sunnah undergo such semantico-contextual changes and which processes 
led to the classical definition of Sunnah? In other words, what were the 
background forces and mechanisms behind these semantico-contextual 
changes?
52 Guraya, supra note 25, “Introduction”.
53 www.understanding-islam.org/sourcesofislam.
54 Z.I. Ansari, “An Early Discussion on Islamic Jurisprudence: Some Notes on Al-Radd 
ʿalā Siyar al-Awzaʾi ”, in: Islamic Perspectives: Studies in Honour of Mawlana Sayyid Abdul 
A’la Mawdudi, K. Ahmad and I.Z. Ansari (eds.) (UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1979). 
55 B.M. Wheeler, Applying the Canon in Islam—The Authorization and Maintenance of 
Interpretive Reasoning in Hanafi Scholarship”, (Albany: State University of New York 
Press,1996) 18.
56 Al-Azami, supra note 50, p. 33.
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3.2. Epistemologico-methodological Changes in Definition and Scope of the 
Sunnah 
The questions raised above led us inevitably to the epistemologico-
methodological aspects behind the transfer in meaning and connotation of 
the concept of Sunnah. This part of the article traces the development of 
the concept of Sunnah and how it was understood during the first four 
generations of Muslims.
In the context of the overall aims of this article than we are interested in, 
defining the scope of the body of knowledge used to determine what con-
stituted Sunnah during the pre-classical period and juxtaposing it with the 
epistemological boundaries governing “authentic” Ḥadīth to determine 
whether there are any epistemological discrepancies or disparities between 
the two. We are also interested in bringing to light the methodological 
tools used in defining and determining the concept of Sunnah during the 
pre-classical era and contrast these tools with those implied by the classical 
definition of Sunnah. Additionally, this will give us an insight into the 
epistemological boundaries and methodological mechanisms which have 
been used when defining Sunnah.
Part of the analysis will focus on depicting the broad and general trends 
in the evolution in perceptions of legitimacy of the use of raʾy (personal 
judgment based on reason) when defining the concept of Sunnah57 and of 
the moral epistemological boundaries of the same.58 This will allow us to 
establish if there was a qualitative difference in epistemological assump-
tions governing the concept of Sunnah during the pre-classical and classi-
cal periods as the classical definition of Sunnah excludes the use of reason 
when determining the Sunnah compliance or otherwise of a certain act or 
practices if it is based upon an authentic Ḥadīth. In other words we shall 
try to ascertain to what extent and for how long Sunnah as a concept 
remained largely epistemologically and methodologically independent of 
‘authentic Ḥadīth’. Chronology, as we shall see, plays a very important part 
in the way the relationship between Sunnah and “authentic Ḥadīth” is 
57 Since Sunnah is organically linked and derives its legitimacy from the Qurʾān, this 
analysis also applies to the Qurʾān.
58 The same could be applied to Qurʾānic interpretation but is outside the scope of this 
study. For a very insightful treatment of this question, see G. Hourani, “Ethical Pre-
suppositions of the Qurʾān”, Muslim World, 70 ( Jan. 1980) 1-28, henceforth ‘Ethical’.
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conceptualised because the usage of both59 concepts, as we earlier demon-
strated, evolved against a different semantico-contextual background. 
Firstly, we will investigate how the concept of Sunnah at the time of the 
Prophet was understood.
3.2.1. Sunnah as Epistemologico-methodologically Independent of Ḥadīth—
a chronological analysis
3.2.1.1. Sunnah and at the Time of the Prophet
Professors Izutsu60 and Hallaq61 claim that the emerging Qurʾānic Weltan-
schauung during the revelationary period was not completely divorced 
from its pre-Qurʾānic one. Although the Qurʾān is to be considered an 
independent ethico-religious and linguistic entity with its own worldview, 
it did not claim a complete epistemological break with pre-Qurʾānic 
Arabia.62 Over the revelationary period of some two decades, the Qurʾān 
rejected, modified, condoned and accepted the socio-cultural values and 
moral of Arabian tribal communionism of pre-Qurʾānic Arabia in accor-
dance with the budding Qurʾānic ontological and ethico-religious value 
system. The foundation of this emerging Qurʾānic view of “reality” was, 
quite naturally, the Qurʾān as embodied by the Prophet himself.63
The notion of Sunnah was, as we argued earlier, a well-known concept in 
pre-revelational Arabia understood as a normative action-behavioural64 sys-
tem set by an individual worthy of tribe’s emulation, in the post-revelational 
period logically ascribed to the bearer of Revelation himself.65 With the 
Prophet amongst their midst, the early Muslim community had a direct 
59 The author has presented an evolution of the concept of an authentic Ḥadīth in the 
article, A. Duderija, “The evolution in the concept of an authentic Ḥadīth in relation to the 
concept of Sunnah during the first four generation of Muslims”, unpublished article.
60 T. Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qurʾān, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 
1966).
61 W. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) 32-33.
62 Cf., M. Fletcher, “How Can We Understand Islamic Law Today?”, Journal of Islam 
and Islamo-Christian Relations, 17/2 (April 2006) 159-172.
63 Cf., Ansari, supra note 6.
64 In contrast to written as in the case of Ḥadīth. Henceforth, The Origins and 
Evolution.
65 The phrase ‘Sunnah of the Prophet’ seems to have emerged immediately after his 
death. Hallaq, supra note 61, p. 47; cf., M.M. Bravmann, The Spiritual Background of Early 
Islam: Studies in Ancient Arab Concepts, (Leiden: Brill, 1972) 133, 168-174.
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access to the living commentary of the Revelation, and through him a liv-
ing link to the Divine. The Prophet’s persona and character as a source of 
Revelation-based authority and normativeness for his contemporary adher-
ents and believers in his Prophethood was a natural fact and a matter of 
common sense. With the Prophet alive in Makkah/Medina, the Muslim 
community was witnessing his activities daily and was subject to his 
instructions directly, that is without an intermediary. The community 
did not engage in systematically debating the questions of the nature 
and the scope of the Prophetic authority. When the need arose they could 
seek advice and consult him in matters needing personal or communal 
clarification.66
Indeed, in the Qurʾānic verses such as 59:767 and 4:64,68 the Qurʾān 
mentions the necessary intervention of and obedience to the Prophet in 
the affairs of the community.69 These, however, were not dogmatic in nature, 
i.e., did not pertain to the realm of beliefs.70
The Qurʾān, therefore, can be said to testify to that fact that the Prophet 
enjoyed extra-revelational authority based on “right and just practice”,71 
but that this privilege was always exercised in conjunction with concepts of 
mutual consultation with community in a most balanced and delicate 
way.72 Additionally, Dutton further substantiates this point. Based on his 
study of Mālik’s Muwatṭạ he asserts that, “for Mālik the Prophet is clearly 
a source of extra-Qurʾānic judgement but this ‘extra- Qurʾānic’ element is 
66 Cf., Ansari, supra note 6, pp. 156-171.
67 Q59:7, “So take what Apostle assigns to you and deny yourselves that which he 
withholds from you” (Y. Ali). “And whatever the messenger gives you take it, but whatever 
he forbiddeth, abstain (from it)” (M. Picthall).
68 Q4:64: “We have sent not an Apostle but to be obeyed in accordance with the Will 
of Allah” (Y. Ali); “We sent the Messenger save that he should be obeyed by Allah’s leave” 
(M. Picthall).
69 It must be admitted that the verses mentioned, like many parts of the Qurʾān, were 
situational/contextual in character and had specific occasions of revelation—first linked to 
the distribution of booty and second to a concrete internal problem within the Muslim 
Medinian community. 
70 In these matters the Prophet’s role was merely that of the Messenger, i.e., the conveyer 
of Revelation.
71 Additionally, the fact that ʿamal/practice of the entire Medinian community was 
recognised as a source of law by certain schools of thoughts (the Mālikī madhhab in 
particular) is clear evidence that the Prophet’s authority was not restricted to theological or 
faith matters stemming from the Qurʾān.
72 Ibid., p. 186. Generally on this see Graham, supra note 3; also see, Ansari, supra note 6.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
221
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
ALQ 26.4_f2_393-438.indd   406 7/20/2012   2:54:04 PM
 A. Duderija / Arab Law Quarterly 26 (2012) 393-437 407
considered to be within the general principals outlined by the Qurʾān 
rather than a separate one.”73
Elaborating on this point of organic, directly interwoven Sunnah-
Qurʾān dynamic at the time of the Prophet in Mālik’s Muwatṭạ, Dutton 
also remarks that: 
Many of the fundamental obligations of the Qurʾān, such as doing the prayer, paying 
zakāt and going on hajj, could not have been put into practice unless there were some 
practical demonstrations of how to do so, and the obvious model for this of course was 
that of the one who first put thee obligations in practice, i.e. the Prophet. The Qurʾān 
could not, therefore, be divorced from its initial context, i.e. the life of the Prophet, 
and, although its supremacy of the text remained beyond question, it was always seen 
in the light of its first practical expression, namely, the Sunnah of the Prophet.74
Thus, due to the nature of Qurʾānic content it was in need of Sunnah, that 
is, in need of both Deutungsbeduerftigkeit and of a practical manifestation 
in actu. This organic link between the Message and the Messenger is cap-
tured best by often-repeated Qurʾānic phrase exhorting the believers to 
“Obey God and the Prophet”.75 This unity of “prophetic-revelatory event”, 
to use Graham’s phrase, has from the very beginning and throughout the 
first 150 years of the formative Islamic thought reflected the early Muslim 
understanding of the function, nature the scope and the relationship 
between the Qurʾān and Sunnah.76 This interdependent, symbiotic rela-
tionship between the Qurʾān and Sunnah enjoyed wide-spread acceptable 
in early Islam. In this context Graham maintains that:
It appears [that] for the Companions and the early Followers of the Prophet, the 
divine activity manifested in the mission of Muhammad was a unitary reality in which 
the divine word, the prophetic guidance, and even the example and witness of all who 
participated in the sacred history of the Prophet’s time, were all perceived as comple-
mentary, integral aspects of a single phenomenon.77
Similarly, this hermeneutically intimate relationship is also noted by 
Sachedina who avers the following:
73 Dutton, supra note 51, p. 164.
74 Ibid., p. 163.
75 Q4:59; 4:64; 3:132; 3:32; and many others.
76 Graham, supra note 3, p. 12. 
77 Ibid., p. 15; cf., Ansari, supra note 6.
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Explication of the divine intention of the revelation was among the functions that the 
Qurʾān assigned to the Prophet. The Prophet functioned as the projection of the divine 
message embodied in the Qurʾān. He was the living commentary of the Qurʾān, inex-
tricately related to the revelatory text. Without the Prophet the Qurʾān was incompre-
hensible, just as without the Qurʾān, the Prophet was no prophet at all.78
Similarly, in his investigation of an early Ḥanafī jurist, ʿIsa b. Aban 
(d. 221/836), Bedir asserts that at this time the hierarchy of the Qurʾān 
and Sunnah was not yet clear.79 This unity of “prophetic-revelatory event”, 
to use Graham’s phrase, has from the very beginning and throughout the 
first 150 years of the formative Islamic thought reflected the early Muslim 
understanding of the function, nature the scope and the relationship 
between Qurʾān and Sunnah.80 This interdependent, symbiotic relation-
ship between Qurʾān and Sunnah, therefore, enjoyed wide-spread accept-
ability in early Islam. It was expressed in a phrase kitāb (i.e. the Qurʾān) wa 
sunna.81 Thus, similar to the Qurʾān the concept of Sunnah (but not sạḥīḥ 
Ḥadīth as by product of ʿulūm al-ḥadīth sciences) can be seen as a type 
of wahy.82
Apart from this symbiotic Qurʾāno-Sunnahic relationship stemming 
from the very nature of the Qurʾānic revelation, another aspect of the 
Qurʾānic revelation influenced the character of Sunnah as exemplified by 
the Prophet. The predominantly ethico-religious character of the Qurʾān 
and the Qurʾānic legislative dimension as well as its overriding concern for 
the moral conduct of humans83 translated itself into Prophetic activity 
which emphasised a person’s moral responsibility and God consciousness 
rather than law formulation.84 This nature and the character of the Qurʾānic 
revelation and its legislative element, embodied and continued by the 
78 A. Sachedina, “Scriptural Reasoning in Islam”, Journal of Scriptural Reasoning, 
5/1 (April 2005).
79 M. Bedir, “An Early Response to Shāfiʿī: Isa b. Aban on the Prophetic Report 
(Khabar)”, Islamic Law and Society, 9/3 (2002) 285-311, p. 303.
80 Graham, supra note 3, p. 12. 
81 Shaykh Abdalqadir al-Murabit, Root Islamic Education, http://bewley.virtualave.net/
Root4.html.
82 A. ʿAzim Sharafuddin, Tarikh ut-tashriʿ l-Islāmī, Benghazi, 1973, p. 59.
83 In this context, Ansari’s following remarks are quite pertinent: Qurʾānic legislation 
differs from legal codes in form as well as in spirit and purpose. Its basic motivation is 
religious and moral rather than ‘legal’ in a narrow sense of the term. Its aim is to lay down 
certain standards of conduct that are intrinsically good and conducive to the good pleasure 
of God. Ansari, supra note 6, p. 143.
84 Or more precisely legal norms were conceived more in ethico-religious terms. 
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Prophet, was geared towards certain underlying legislative norms which 
were based on certain purposes and objectives.85 Schacht (rightly) observes 
this fact when describing the origins and development of Islamic Law by 
saying: “Had religious and ethical standards been comprehensively applied 
to all aspects of human behaviour, and had they been consistently followed 
in practice, there would have been no room and no need for a legal system 
in the narrow meaning of the term. This was in fact the original ideal of 
Muhammad.”86 This claim will be investigated more closely in subsequent 
parts of this study.
As alluded to above, another phenomenon that needs to be taken into 
consideration in the context of evolution of the concept of Sunnah is 
that during the formative period of Islamic thought the oral nature of 
transmission and authentification of knowledge as well as oral-based inter-
pretative strategies of the primary sources were considered more authentic 
and were more prevalent then written-based ones. In this context Souaiaia 
avers that: 
In the practices of scholars and jurists closest to the time of the Prophet , there seems 
to be an overwhelming attraction to isnād-based oral reports and momentous lack of 
interest in the published literature, a phenomenon that can be documented for at least 
one-hundred years after the recording (tadwīn) era.87
He also convincingly argues that the processes of formulation, preserva-
tion and transmission of religious and legal knowledge was “fully and 
exclusively oral”.88 The above distinctions are of fundamental importance 
to this study from the point of view of understanding the evolution of the 
concept of an authentic Sunnah in relation to that of an ‘authentic’ 
Ḥadīth.
An additional issue needing clarification is the evolution in the scope of 
and the function or the employment of the use of reason in the Qurʾān and 
Sunnah, especially in relation to the assumptions governing the nature of 
85 Ansari, supra note 6, pp. 144-146. This seemed to have given birth to jurisprudent 
and legal theory literature that emphasized the importance of the maqasid or purpose/
objective-based approach to Islamic Law and its theory as evident in the writings of Al-
Tusi, Shatibi and Ghazali to name a few. See Hallaq, supra note 4.
86 J. Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) Introduction. 
Importantly, this purely Qurʾān-based religious ethics theory is yet to be developed by 
Muslim scholars. See next footnote.
87 Ibid., p. 131; cf., Souaiaia, supra note 18.
88 Souaiaia, ibid., p. 94.
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ethical value in the same. To date, the epistemologico-moral boundaries 
and character of the Qurʾān from the point of view of its own context, that 
is, divorced from its traditional scriptural interpretation itself, have not 
been comprehensively studied”.89 Modern scholars of Muslim tradition 
such as Hourani, maintain that the Qurʾān cannot be said to completely 
disregard the value of ʿaql (inherent human reason) in forming ethical 
judgments, while Reinhart asserts that “[T]he Qurʾānic message time 
and again appeals to impartial knowledge that confirms the Qurʾānic 
summons”.90 Moreover, Reinhart argues that ʿaql ’s explicit Qurʾānic endorse-
ment in recognising God’s existence, Unity and Grandeur are considered 
to favour its implicit usage in the realms of ethics and morality.91
In terms of epistemologico-methodological boundaries of the Sunnah at 
the time of the Prophet, Hourani states that in terms of ethical knowledge, 
the Qurʾān (and therefore Sunnah) considers revelation its major source 
but that “it is probable, but unproven, that natural reason is also capable 
of forming ethical judgements [independent of revelation]”.92 Further-
more, argues Hourani, in terms of ethical epistemology boundaries the 
Qurʾānic nature of ethical value is generally objective, “the use of indepen-
dent reason in ethical judgements is never ruled out explicitly in the 
Qurʾān, and there are some considerations that favour implicit assump-
tions of its use”. It is further maintained that:
. . . Qurʾān and Muhammad both display a common sense attitude and that we should 
not expect either of them to claim that for every ethical judgement he makes a man 
89 Hourani, “Ethical Pre-Suppositions” is the most notable study on this question; see 
supra note 58. K. Reinhart’s study on boundaries of moral epistemology in Islamic thought 
focuses on assessments of human acts prior to Revelation and how they were used in 
development of Islamic jurisprudential terminology and law as espoused by authorities 
living in the second and subsequent centuries who themselves operated within a larger 
Qurʾāno-Sunnahic hermeneutic; see Reinhart, Before Revelation—The Boundaries of Muslim 
Moral Thought, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995) 3. Some of the implicit 
findings of this study are useful to us and will be used in this article. Izutsu’s works cited 
previously attempt to define Qurʾānic ethico-religious concepts from the point of view of 
historical semantics rather than their epistemological sources and as such are not directly 
our concern.
90 Reinhart, supra note 89, p. 178.
91 Ibid.
92 Hourani, supra note 58, p. 25.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
231
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
ALQ 26.4_f2_393-438.indd   410 7/20/2012   2:54:04 PM
 A. Duderija / Arab Law Quarterly 26 (2012) 393-437 411
must consult a book or a scholar, or work out an analogy when the book or scholar 
give no direct answer to the Problem.93
Draz, in his exhaustive investigation of the moral world of the Qurʾān, 
echoes this view by concluding that, according to the Qurʾānic moral 
world, the human consciousness in prior to Revelation and that is capable 
of divorcing right from wrong without it.94 The essential common-sensical 
attitude of the Qurʾān and its message are evident in its discourse of 
“nature, ʿaql, the cosmos, and their patterns—all [are] appealed to say that 
the message of the Qurʾān is reasonable”.95 Thus, rationality and ethical 
objectivity certainly cannot be considered as alien to the overall spirit of 
Qurʾānico-Sunnahic teachings.
At the time of the Prophet then the concept of Sunnah was associated 
quite naturally with him, and, except from its ʿibadat component, seemed 
to have been understood primarily as a general, ethico-religious and, in 
Medina, politico-administrative,96 concept based upon righteous custom-
ary practice that partially reflected some of the pre-Qurʾānic customs and 
practices not contrary to Qurʾānic worldview.97 The legislative component 
of Sunnah, which in no doubt existed, was in consonance with the nature 
of the Qurʾān as the “most trustworthy mirror of the Prophet’s outlook and 
teaching”, also primarily conceived in religio-moral rather than positivistic 
terms.98 These religious and moral teachings, in fact, functioned as a refer-
ence point for legal evaluation.99
How the concept of Sunnah was understood in the subsequent two 
generation of Muslims is what we turn our attention to now.
3.2.2.2. Sunnah at the Time of Companions and Successors
Over the period of approximately one decade,100 the Muslim community 
had ample opportunity to internalise and absorb the overall spirit, ethos 
 93 Ibid., p. 23.
 94 M.A. Draz, The Moral World of the Qurʾān, (I.B. Taurus, 2008).
 95 Reinhart, supra note 89, p. 23.
 96 Mathnee has argued that early concept of Sunnah is to be primarily thought of as a 
political concept. See Mathnee, supra note 17, Ch. 2.
 97 Cf., Ansari, supra note 6.
 98 Ibid.
 99 Ibid., pp. 144-146.
100 Of course, some spent less and some more time with the Prophet living in their 
midst. 
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and the character of the Prophet based on the overall Qurʾānic worldview. 
Juynboll refers to this notion of Sunnah as “practice based on the memory 
of the collective concept of Prophet’s followers on whose basis the com-
munity’s cohesion rested”.101
During this period of time Prophet’s Companions102 observed his 
embodiment of the Qurʾānic message and how it was applied in society in 
terms of his behaviour, word and deed. The Prophet’s action-behavioural 
system was quite naturally described by the Muslim community as 
Sunnah103 and carried a degree of normativeness whose anchoring point 
was the Qurʾān. In cases of the performance of congregational prayers and 
ritual purification, for example, the Muslim community in Medina inter-
nalised and embodied these practices by engaging in their daily perfor-
mance with the Prophet. Therefore both Companions and the Medinian 
community became the collective embodiment and perpetuators of these 
aspects of the Prophet’s Sunnah.104 In this context Graham astutely observes:
Naturally enough, the living Sunnah (“way”, “practice”) of the charismatic Ummah 
(and the Medinian community in particular), which was rooted in the Sunnah of the 
prophet, became the active, practical standard of authoritative faith and practice.105
The practical and oral perpetuation of Sunnah must have been very com-
mon during the era of the Prophet. It is for these reasons that Mālik 
(d. 179 AH), as we already mentioned, considered that from the very 
inception of Muslim community in Medina to his time Sunnah and 
101 G.H.A. Junyboll, Muslim Tradition—Studies in Chronology, Provenance and Authorship 
of Early Ḥadīth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 9. 
102 Traditionally a Companion is any person who was in a direct contact with the 
Prophet while he was alive. 
103 Juynboll, supra note 46, pp. 98, 100; cf., Bravmann, supra note 65, pp. 123-198; cf., 
Guraya, supra note 25, pp. 33-34.
104 The view that the Companions were the best sources of Sunnah is related in the 
following report found in Al-Qayrawani (d. 356 AH); An-Nakhaiʾi (a Successor) said: 
“Even if I had seen Companions making wuduʾ up to the wrists, I would have performed 
wuduʾ like that although I recite it ‘Up to the elbows’.” (Surat al-Maʾidah, Q7).That is 
because they cannot be suspected of abandoning Sunnahs. They were the masters (arbāb) 
of knowledge and the most eager of Allah’s people to follow the Messenger of Allah, may 
Allah bless him and grant him peace.” Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani, A Medinian View—on 
the Sunnah, Courtesy, Wisdom, Battles and History, (tr.) Abdassamad Clarke, (Londen: TaHa 
Publishers, 1999) 25-26.
105 Graham, supra note 3, p. 12.
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Qurʾān were inseparable both of which were interpreted and perpetuated 
against the ʿamal/practice of the community rather than simply from the 
texts.106
The first link in this ʿamal and oral-based Sunnah were the caliphs who 
acted and expanded upon the Prophet’s Sunnah after his death. As the 
political authority was transferred to them after the Prophet’s demise, the 
caliphs, based on their impeccable status as witness bearers of the Qurʾāno-
Sunnahic ideals, became sources of Sunnah themselves.107 As Hallaq 
remarks “these caliphs set a model of good behaviour [and did not] neces-
sarily laid down specific rulings”.108 Indeed, “caliphal authority was not 
derivative of that of the Prophet but ran parallel to it”.109 Juynboll main-
tains that “it is generally accepted fact that the first four caliphs set their 
own standards [and that] they ruled the community in the spirit of the 
Prophet, thinking their own solutions to the problems rather than meticu-
lously copying his actions”.110 This is further substantiated by Souaiaia’s 
assertion that the classical Islamic law recognised the personal informed 
opinion of the first four caliphs alongside those of renowned companions, 
in addition to the Qurʾān and Sunnah, to be sources of law.111 Mathnee 
goes even further by stating that the early concept of Sunnah was such that 
it was used in an arbitrary112 fashion without reference to a particular 
authority and that it was susceptible to continuous change. He maintains 
further that the Sunnah could refer to a practice or a tradition or a 
106 Dutton, supra note 51, Chs. 8 and 9; Indeed this ‘amal-based Sunnah was considered 
superior to Ḥadīth; cf., Al-Qayrawani, supra note 104, p. 26; cf., Guraya, supra note 25; 
Abd-Allah, supra note 49.
107 Ansari, supra note 19, pp. 277-278; see also Crone and Hinds, supra note 32, p. 66; 
also Juynboll, supra note 46, pp. 101-104.
108 Hallaq, supra note 4, p. 12.
109 Hallaq, supra note 61, p. 43.
110 Juynboll, supra note 101, p. 15.
111 Souaiaia, supra note 18, p. 245.
112 I have presented a critique of the view of the arbitrary nature of Sunnah and early fiqh 
in “The role of Sunnah in early Fiqh” (article under review). In essence, my argument runs 
as follows: Decisions/legal rulings based on sunnah akhkaqiyyah and sunnah fiqhiyyah that 
are rooted in Sunnah’s (and by extension the Qurʾān’s) ethico-moral and objective nature of 
values dimension such as justice, righteousness or fairness could be interpreted/seen as 
arbitrary since they do not follow a literal/textual precedent. However, if the Qurʾān and 
Sunnah are conceptualised as embodying and facilitating these values in the first place, as 
in the case of Caliph ʿUmar, then these decisions/legal rulings cannot be seen as arbitrary 
but rather being part of the actual normative Qurʾāno-Sunnahic teachings. 
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 combination of both and with multiple equivalent authorities.113 Guraya 
expresses a similar view by maintaining that in early Islam the concept of 
Sunnah was not ‘specifically determined’, that it changed over time”.114 In 
other words, we could talk about several types of Sunān (pl. of Sunnah) at 
this point in time, that of individuals other than the Prophet (mainly well-
known Companions and early caliphs) and the collective conduct of indi-
viduals upon which ʿamal-based Sunnah rested.115 In this context Juynboll 
asserts:
. . . the associations of sunnas with persons other than the Prophet are so numerous and 
varied that that does not permit us to assume that the Prophet’s example overshad-
owed or indeed eclipsed that of others, at least not during the first hundred and fifty 
years or so after his death.116
These different anchoring points and sources of Sunnah at this point in 
time, however, were considered as one coherent whole rather then being 
conceptually different in any significant way.
This rather methodologically amorphous, ethico-moral and values-based 
and adaptable117 definition of Sunnah/Sunān,118 conceptually organically 
113 Mathnee, supra note 17, p. 12.
114 Guraya, supra note 25, “Introduction”.
115 cf. Hallaq, supra note 61, p.102; cf., S. Spektrovsky, “Sunnah in the Responses of 
Ishaq b. Rahwayh”, in: Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, B. Weiss, ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2002) 
pp. 51-70, in which the author asserts that Bin Rahwayah (d. 238 AH), a fāqih, uses the 
concept of Sunnah in the following ways: Sunnah alone (it is uncertain if the final authority 
of Sunnah is based upon practice or tradition or combination of both); Sunnah of the 
Companions supported by authority of the Prophet and Sunnah of the Prophet established 
by a legal maxim.
116 Juynboll, supra note 46, pp. 100-101.
117 Mathnee describes this Sunnah as having “an incoherent structure and arbitrary 
nature”; see supra note 17, Ch. 2.
118 Professor Rahman claims that in the early Muslim community, “Prophetic Sunnah 
was a general umbrella-concept rather than filled with an absolutely specific content flows 
directly, at a theoretical level, from the fact that Sunnah is a behavioural term: since no two 
cases, in practice, are ever exactly identical in their situational setting—moral, psychological 
and material—Sunnah must of necessity, allow for interpretation and adaptation.” He also 
uses phrases for Sunnah such as “a point in direction rather than exactly laid out series of 
rules” or “Sunnah as authoritative, normative precedent” to further consolidate the point 
of generality and unspecifisity of Sunnah as a concept. See F. Rahman, “The Living Sunna 
and al-Sunnah wa l-Jamaʿah”, pp. 137-138 in Ḥadīth and Sunnah—Ideals and Realities 
Selected Essays, (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1996); cf., Hallaq, supra note 61, 
p. 77.
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linked to the Qurʾān, the Practice of the Prophet, his Companions and 
embodied by the Medinian community remained essentially the same dur-
ing the time of the first caliphs.119 For example this concept of Sunnah is 
also evident in its usage when the confrontation between ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib 
and Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān [q.vv.] at Sịffīn (37/657 [q.v.]) was resolved 
with an arbitration agreement on the basis of the kitāb Allāh and al-sunnah 
al-ʿādil al-dhjāmi ʿa ghayr al-mufarriḳa (i.e. the Book of God and the just 
Sunnah that unites rather than disperses).120
Sunnah, as a concept, therefore, was not seen as a codified set of positive 
laws but rather as either a moral precedent that could be adapted to various 
contexts/circumstances or was identified with certain practices evident in 
the Muslim Medinian community. Hallaq also takes the view that, at this 
time, Sunān “were not legally binding narratives but subjective notions of 
justice put to various uses and discursive strategies”.121
The early Muslim community during the first two to three decades after 
the Prophet’s death was still a relatively small, self-contained one where the 
vast majority of the Companions lived.122 This meant that the prevalent 
conditions for diffusion of Sunān123 without reliance on written documen-
tation was relatively easy and quick to achieve, and remained the primary 
source of transmission of Sunān during the time of the Companions.124 
With the rapid expansion of the Muslim empire towards the end of the 
119 That the ambiguity regarding what Sunnah is and who/what the sources of Sunnah 
are existed even during the second century and is clearly demonstrated in a well-known 
anecdote between Zuhri (51-24 AH) and Salih b. Kaisan when discussing what might and 
might not be considered Sunnah. It is reproduced below. Salih says: I met with Zuhri while 
we were both seeking knowledge. Thus we said, let us write down the Sunnah. We wrote 
down what was related from the Prophet. Then he [Zuhri] said: Let us write down what is 
related on the authority of Companions for it is [also] Sunnah. I told him that it is not 
Sunnah, therefore, we should not write it down. Zuhri wrote it down, and I did not write 
it. He attained success, while I met with failure; cited in Al-Azami, supra note 50, p. 84. 
120 G.H.A. Juynboll, D.W. Brown, “Sunnah”, in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn., 
P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs, eds. (Leiden: 
Brill, 2011); Brill Online, University of Melbourne, 19 May 2011: <http://www.brillonline
.nl.ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_COM-1123>.
121 Hallaq, supra note 61, p. 47.
122 For a very detailed analysis of the Prophet’s Companions after his death, their place 
of residence and political/tribal affiliations, see F. Jabali, The Companions of the Prophet—
A Study of Geographical Distribution and Political Alingments, (Leiden: Brill, 2003). 
123 Sunān is plural rather than singular Sunnah due to above-mentioned reasons.
124 It also should be kept in mind that throughout this period, ʿamal-based Sunnah as 
well as values and ethico-religious-based Sunnah (derived from the Qurʾān) that was 
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first half of the first century Hijrah and the accompanying changes in the 
socio-political climate made the problem of transmission and dissemina-
tion of non-written Sunān more difficult.125
Companions, the sources and perpetuators of the Prophet’s Sunnah as 
understood at that time-period, dispersed to various provinces of the ever-
expanding Muslim Empire.126 With the establishment of the Companions 
in these provinces, people who did not have the opportunity to see the 
Prophet first-hand or were born after the Prophet’s death, termed Succes-
sors (tabʿīn), were eager to find out from them what the Prophet did, how 
he behaved and acted. Companions, however, were facing increasingly 
new problems to which they had no specific Prophetic precedent due to 
the nature of the Sunnah as it was understood at that time. In such cases, 
Companions used their own judgment and reason in order to arrive at 
solutions, which were still considered as falling under the general aegis 
of the Prophetic precedent. Al-Azami also noted this by remarking that 
“[S]ometimes the norms drawn analogically from the practice or the say-
ings of the Prophet were also called sunna”.127 This assertion is also sub-
stantiated by the fact that Muslims at that time “regarded as authoritative 
not only the precepts and practices of the Prophet, but also those of his 
Companions”.128 In this context Hakim maintains that:
It is not unusual for companions of the Prophet to be credited with a Sunnah of their 
own. Thus, Abu Bakr, together with Umar, is credited to have Sunna . . . In other tradi-
tions we find expressions such like ‘sunnāt Abī Bakr al-rashidah al-mahdiyah” or 
“sunnāt Abī Bakr aw ʿUmar aw Uthman aw ʿAlī ”. Moreover, the Islamic tradition 
frequently refers to sunnāt ʿUmar.129
prevalent at the time of the Prophet and the Companions was epistemologically independent 
of any potentially written-based documentation of it.
125 We will investigate these more closely in the part that deals with evolution of written-
based Sunnah.
126 Reportedly, some 188 Companions migrated from Madina and Makkah, Iraq, Syria, 
Egypt and Khurasan: Hallaq, supra note 61, p. 72; see also Jabali, supra note 122, 
pp. 84-137.
127 Al-Azami, supra note 50, p. 36.
128 Ansari states: “The authority of the Companions was well-established circa 75 AH 
and the precepts and practices of the Prophet as well as the Companions continued to be 
characterised as Sunnah.” Ansari, supra note 19, p. 280.
129 A. Hakim, “Conflicting Images of Lawgivers: The Caliph and the Prophet (Sunnat 
ʿUmar wa Sunnat Muhammad )”, in: H. Berg (ed.), Method and Theory in the Study of 
Islamic Origins, (Leiden: Brill, 2003) 159-160.
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That the Companions themselves made a distinction between Sunnah (in 
this instance in the form of the Medinian ʿamal ) and Ḥadīth ‘It has been 
transmitted that ʿUmar ibn al-Khattab said on the minbar, “Through 
Allah’s help, glory be to Him, I will cause to be severely straightened the 
circumstance of any man who transmits a Ḥadīth contrary to the ʿamal of 
Madinah”.’130
The above-described concept of Sunnah seems to have been transmitted 
to the Successors largely in a manner similar to that which the Compan-
ions themselves received it that is via practical means based on the overall 
spirit of the Prophet’s life legacy. For example, in Medina, a Successor, Ibn 
Musayyib (d. 90 H) and his colleagues founded schools of jurisprudence 
based on the verdicts of ʿUmar and Uthman,131 while, in Kufa, Nakhaʾi 
(d. 95 H), also a Successor, and his associates, based their opinions and 
knowledge of jurisprudence (tafaqquh) on legal opinions ( fatwā, pl. 
futāwā) of an esteemed Companion Ibn Mas’ud (d. 94 H) and the fourth 
Caliph Alī (d. 40 H) largely independent of any written-based documenta-
tion of Prophetic actions or words.132 The nature of this Sunnah as espoused 
by these authorities was still very much in tune with that of the Prophet, 
as Nakhai, an Iraqi law specialist:
. . . did no more than give opinions on questions of ritual and perhaps kindred prob-
lems of directly religious importance, cases of conscience concerning alms tax, mar-
riage, divorce and the like, but not on technical points of law. The same is true of 
Ibrahim’s contemporaries in Medina.133
The legal character of Sunnah manifesting itself in a body of literature on 
positive law was thus still not evident at this point in time. This led Schacht 
to conclude that what we could term a distinctively new Qurʾāno-Sunnahic 
law anchored in the Prophetic dicta (Ḥadīth, corpus-based or not) was 
non-existent during the most of the first century Hijrah.134 This assertion 
is echoed by Hallaq who maintains that “evidence from the early sources 
130 Shaykh Abdalqadir al-Murabit, Root Islamic Education, http://bewley.virtualave.net/
Root4.html.
131 Well-known Companions and the second and third caliphs.
132 A.I. Islahi, Juristic Differences, (Lahore: Islamic Publication Ltd., 1986) 43-45.
133 Schacht, supra note 86, p. 27.
134 Ibid., p. 19.
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appears to support the view that the legal authority during the better part 
of the first Islamic century was in no way exclusively Prophetic”.135
The jurisprudential activity of Successors led to the formation of regional 
centres of Sunnah based on their understanding of Sunnah that was trans-
mitted to them via the Companions. Thus, the regional Sunnah was ulti-
mately deriving its legitimacy and authority from the Companions rather 
than from the Prophet.136 This geographically based Sunnah was then dif-
fused throughout the region itself. It, in turn, served as a foundation on 
which the practice of the people was based or was normatively assessed 
against.137
As such, the Sunnah-based practices of Muslim community as a whole 
within a particular region also became embodiments of Sunnah as well as 
sources and perpetuators of Sunnah for subsequent generations.
The use of the practice of Muslims/believers in Medina as additional 
sources of Sunnah, argues Dutton, features prominently in Mālik’s Muwatṭạ 
and is described as ʿamal.138 This ʿamal was based upon the Qurʾān, Sun-
nah dating from time of the Prophet and an element of raʾy139 of later 
authorities which merged into it.140 Although what we just said pertains 
primarily to Medina, similar processes in other major regional schools such 
as Kufa, Basra, Syria and Egypt were taking place.141
For example, notion of practice as indicator of Sunnah is also evident in 
Abū Yusuf ’s writings who lived in Kufa. The practice-based Sunnah derives, 
135 Hallaq, supra note 61, p. 43.
136 I.e., Companions’ interpretation of Sunnah of the Prophet, see Schacht, supra note 
86, pp. 32-33; also Hallaq, supra note 61, p. 102. This is further supported by Souaiaia’s 
characterisation of Islamic law as being accretive in nature: see Souaiaia, supra note 18.
137 Dutton, supra note 51, p. 36.
138 Ibid., pp. 37-41, 165.
139 Personal judgement/opinion—we shall investigate the changes in the meaning and 
usage of this term shortly.
140 Ibid., p. 35; cf., Guraya, supra note 25, p. 34.
141 “. . . companions have spread throughout the new lands of Islam taking with them the 
knowledge of Qurʾān and Sunnah, and exercising their best judgement ( yajtahidūna bi 
ra’yihīm) when they knew of no specific guidance on the matter . . . Furthermore the first 
three caliphs had been concerned to avoid dispute among the Muslim troops and had sent 
directives to them on even relatively unimportant matters in order to establish the dīn and 
prevent dispute over the Book and Sunnah, but they never told anyone to go against the 
practice of any of the companions, whether in Egypt, Syria or Iraq . . .”, Dutton, supra 
note 51, p. 175; for regional differences in ‘Sunnah’ see also Al-Azami, supra note 50, 
pp. 58-80; Guraya, supra note 25, pp. 54-78, on what he refers to as “Ancient view of 
Sunnah and Ḥadīth”.
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in his view, from “those norms which were recognised as such by the Mus-
lims in general, were accepted by the fuqahāʾ and which had come down 
through reliable and learned people (al-sunnah ‘an rasul Allāh ʿan al-salaf 
min ashabih wa min qawm fuqahāʾ ).142 Similarly, early Ibadism filtered 
Ḥadīth on the basis of al-ḥaqq al-maʿruf fī kitāb Allāh wa sunnāt nabiyyihi 
wa athar al-salihīn, i.e. al-aʾimma wa l-ulama.143 Although in the context 
of Iraq the notion of Medinian ‘amal-based Sunnah did not exist, their 
concept of Sunnah was ultimately derived from the living practice of Com-
panions who migrated from Medina to Iraq and was not expressed in 
Ḥadīth.144
In Motzki’s investigation of the development of early Islamic jurispru-
dence in Makkah it is argued that for a Successor Ata ibn Rabah’s (d. 115 
AH), one of the disciples of Ibn Abbas (d. 67 AH), the founder of the 
Mekkan law school:
. . . die Idee vom Vorbildcharacter der sunna des Propheten und ihrer moeglichen 
Funktion als Rechtsquelle in Ergaenzung zum Koran in sein Denken noch nicht Ein-
gang gefunden hatte oder—falls das schon der Fall war-Ata noch nicht die Notwen-
dingkeit verspuerte, dies im Einzenlen zu belegen. Diese Annahme wird auch durch 
Atas Gebrauch des Wortes sunna gedeckt, das bei ihm den Brauch im Sinne der aner-
kannten gesellschaftlichen Praxis in Mekka bezeichnet.145
Similarly, in Syria the notion of Sunnah as conceptualised by their region’s 
main jurist, Awzaʾi, was understood in terms of an uninterrupted practice 
of Muslims beginning with the Prophet and maintained by the early caliphs 
and later scholars . . . without adducing of Ḥadīth.146
Therefore, “each locale, from Syria to Iraq to the Hejaz, established its 
own legal practices on the basis of what was regarded as the Sunnah of the 
forefathers, be they Companions or the Prophet”.147 Summarizing the 
142 Al-Shāfiʿī, Kitāb al-ʿUmm, Cairo, vol. vii, 1324 AH, p. 320; cf., Ansari, supra note 19, 
pp. 277-278, cf., Ansari, supra note 54, p. 157, and Z.I. Ansari, “The Significance of Shāfiʿī 
Criticism of the Medinese School of Law”, Islamic Studies, 30/4 (1991) 497.
143 J.C. Wilkinson, Ibadism, Origins and Early Development in Oman, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 234, 413-415. The athār, notes Wilkinson, were “virtually opinion 
(ra’y), p. 415.
144 Hallaq, supra note 61, pp. 106-107.
145 H. Motzki, Die Anfaenge der islamischen Jurisprudenz, (Deutsche Morgenlaendische 
Gesellschaft, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991) 115, emphasis is mine. 
146 Hallaq, supra note 61, p. 107; Guraya, Origins, 30.
147 Ibid., p. 107.
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nature and the scope and Sunnah’s method of transmission at this point in 
time, Wheeler asserts:
The authority of the sunnah as prophetic practice, as conceived by the local second 
century authorities, was guaranteed by a continuous tradition of practice through 
generations going back to the prophet. It was defined as an interpretation having an 
authority that was conveyed by the link it represented with the prophetic past. Being 
regarded as either common practice or logically consistent practice, the content of 
sunnah was considered prophetic on account of its receipt from these previous gen-
erations or derivation on the basis of these generations’ practice.148
In terms of its epistemological value, this practice-based Sunnah was, like 
the Qurʾān and unlike a majority of Ḥadīth, a mutawātir-based source of 
knowledge.149
Since Sunnah, in its narrowest edified sense, could only literally be 
applied to those practices and behaviours that surfaced and were estab-
lished during the Prophet’s lifetime, the scope of that body of Sunnah was 
rather limited and was increasingly in need of interpretation and extrapo-
lation. This interpretative need of Sunnah, based on the same characteristic 
of the Qurʾānic text itself, could be satisfied by identifying it150 with certain 
more abstract principles said to be in accordance with the spirit of the 
Qurʾān and Sunnah,151 and which could be deemed relevant to a new case. 
As well, its scope could be expanded by legitimising the use of personal 
judgement based on reason (raʾy).152
The former is termed ‘applied reason or analogy’ (qiyās) and the later 
‘pure reason’ (raʾy/ijtihād ). Decisions based on these thought processes 
148 Wheeler, supra note 55, p. 43. On the meaning of mutawātir see below.
149 Dutton, supra note 51, p. 36. At this stage, the ethico-religious and values-based 
aspects of Sunnah embedded in the Prophet’s rational embodiment of the Qurʾānic 
Weltanschauung started to receive less attention in the overall understanding of the concept 
of Sunnah by Muslim scholars as Sunnah came to be increasingly identified with ʿamal or 
practices extant in the communities. This distorted the nature and the scope of the concept 
as it was understood by the Prophet and the first generation of Muslims. Instead what 
I refer to as sunnah akhlaqiyyah component was increasingly derived from sprouting Ḥadīth 
literature.
150 And therefore the concept of Shariʿah as well.
151 This is exactly what Crone and Hinds suggest about how Sunnah was conceptualised 
up until the Abbasid Caliphate of Al-Mahdi (158-169 AH/775-785 CE); see supra 
note 32, pp. 66-96.
152 Other sources included pre-Qurʾānic Arabian custom and laws and practices in newly 
conquered lands; see Hallaq, supra note 4, pp. 3-15; Hallaq, supra note 61, p. 32.
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would also become parts of Sunnah. Indeed, in this context, Guraya in his 
close analysis of the concept of Sunnah in early Islam maintains that spec-
ulative free thought was considered as genuine, valid and authoritative 
constituent of Sunnah.153 This is exactly what happened when the first four 
caliphs introduced certain penalties, for example, in cases of alcohol prohi-
bition and punishment that had neither a direct precedent in the Qurʾān 
or in the Sunnah.154 These practices were, however, later considered as Sun-
nah for two reasons. Firstly, they were consistent with the concept of the 
spirit of Sunnah because of Sunnah’s conceptualisation in abstract value-
oriented terms. Secondly, and as a direct result of this understanding of 
Sunnah, the caliphs themselves as well as other Companions and fuqahāʾ, 
were considered sources as well as perpetuators of Sunnah.155 In this con-
text Abbott asserts that her investigation of early Arabic literary papyri has 
led her to conclude that:
[The ] term sunnah [which] frequently alternates with the plural Sunān, is not limited 
to the example or conduct of Muhammad but applies also to at least the caliphs Abu 
Bakr and ʿUmar I and to a number of outstanding men who held high office under 
their three heads of state.
Indeed, the basis of Caliphal Law throughout the Umayyad period (up to 
132 AH/750 CE) was based on the Qurʾān, Sunnah in a sense of general, 
good practice and raʾy, so that the Umayyad caliphs were “free to make and 
unmake Sunnah as they wished”.156 Additionally, and importantly, “the 
concept of Sunnah was not in itself an obstacle to legal innovation”.157
Raʾy as well as qiyās were essentially seen as legitimate, pragmatical tools 
in extrapolating law and had a positive connotation to them.158 Ansari 
considers that the personal judgements of jurists “which were considerably 
influenced by subjective considerations . . . [and] accompanied by a broad 
understanding of the spirit and goals of Islam, played a fairly important 
153 Guraya, supra note 25, “Introduction”.
154 Ibid., p. 8.
155 In other words, if a behaviour, norm or practice was considered to be just or righteous 
and was not directly linked to a Qurʾānic or Sunnahic precedent and justice/righteousness 
was equated with the spirit of Sunnah (and the Qurʾān) then that behaviour, norm or 
practice was considered to be a Sunnah.
156 Crone and Hinds, supra note 32, p. 55. In this context, Juynboll asserts that “An 
Umayyad’s judgement is positively labelled a Sunna”; Juynboll, supra note 46, p. 103.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid., p. 15; Hallaq, supra note 61, p. 53; Guraya, Origins, pp. 115, 119.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
281
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
ALQ 26.4_f2_393-438.indd   421 7/20/2012   2:54:05 PM
422 A. Duderija / Arab Law Quarterly 26 (2012) 393-437
part in the early Islamic legal thinking”.159 Established juristic authorities 
such as Abdallah b. Abbas (d. 68 AH),160 Hasan al-Basri (d. 110 AH) and 
S. ibn Musayib (d. 90 AH) were representatives of this method. This was 
only possible if both Qurʾān and Sunnah were conceptualised in such 
terms. Moreover, Schacht maintains that raʾy has been an integral part of 
regional Sunnah and an essential element of Islamic thought from its very 
inception.161 Hallaq, furthermore, asserts that the meaning of raʾy during 
the entire first century Hijrah and the portion of the next “was a major 
sources of legal reasoning and judicial rulings”162 and furthermore was 
“very close to and, in fact, could not be separated from Sunnah.”163 Simi-
larly, Guraya in his examination of Mālik’s concept of Sunnah identifies 
sound reason and independent considered opinion (raʾy) as being contitu-
ative of Sunna.164
This raʾy, in words of Rahman, produced an immense wealth of legal, 
religious and moral ideas during the first one and a half centuries approxi-
mately . . . [and] the product of this activity became rather chaotic, i.e. the 
Sunnah of different regions—Hejaz, Iraq, Egypt—became divergent on 
almost every issue of detail”.165 Not only were there differences in doctrines 
between various regions but also within them.166
Juynboll summarises the methods of Sunnahic development during the 
first century Hijrah by saying that two distinct manners were evident: that 
is by resorting to individual judgement (common sense or raʾy) and by the 
quest for, and transmission of, a precedent.167 In a similar tone Hallaq 
asserts that “as late as 90s AH and some decades after qadis (jurists) relied 
on three sources of authority in framing their rulings: Qurʾān, Sunān168 
(including caliphal law) and discretionary opinion (raʾy)”.169 Again, it is 
159 Ansari, supra note 54, p. 153.
160 Motzki, supra note 145, p. 256.
161 Schacht, supra note 86, p. 35.
162 Hallaq, supra note 61, pp. 52-53.
163 Ibid.
164 Guraya, Origins, pp. 115, 119.
165 Rahman, supra note 118, p. 139; cf., Wheeler, supra note 55, pp. 19-43.
166 Motzki, in the context of the beginnings of the development of Islamic jurisprudence 
in Makkah says: “Die Rechtsgelehrsamkeit in Mekka war trotz eines Konsenses in vielen 
Fragen nicht uniform”, supra note 145, p. 258.
167 Juynboll, supra note 46, p. 33; cf., Ansari, supra note 142, pp. 495-496.
168 As understood in accordance with what was said above.
169 Hallaq, supra note 61, p. 44.
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important to note that these sources of Sunnah were entirely independent 
of any form of written documentation (i.e. Ḥadīth).170
Our discussion on the evolution of the concept of Sunnah leads us now 
to the next generation of Muslims, that of the Successors’ Successors.
3.2.2.3. Sunnah at the Time of the Successors’ Successors 
With the end of the first and beginning of the second century, significant 
changes to the concept of Sunnah in the minds of the third generation of 
Muslims started to develop in terms of its source, mode of transmission, 
methodological and epistemological parameters (that is, its nature, sources 
and scope). In this context Juynboll asserts that:
. . . the approximate date of origin of the narrowing down of the concept of Sunnah, 
formerly comprising the Sunnah, or exemplary behaviour, of the Prophet as well as his 
most devoted followers, to the exemplary behaviour of Prophet only . . . [occurred] 
towards the end of the first century of the Hijrah and was conceived at the time of 
Caliph Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (99-101).171
Hallaq dates this shift somewhat earlier by saying that the isolation of Pro-
phetic Sunnah172 from other Sunān began to emerge by the late 60s AH.
The reasons for this process began in the second half of the first century. 
The continued territorial expansion of Muslims meant that ever more 
complex legal and governing processes and institutions had to be put in 
place within the enlarging boundaries of the area under the Muslim rule. 
The notion of the administrative and social practices being based on the 
Qurʾān and Sunnah were still operative and engrained in the minds of 
those Muslims who conquered new lands.
A general perception that the expanding Muslim empire would become 
organically detached from the Qurʾānic and Sunnahic teachings was 
becoming widespread. This realisation had already prompted some Mus-
lims to collect and gather a bound (mushaf   ), official version of the Qurʾān, 
a task that was largely achieved during the reign of the third Caliph 
170 Dutton, supra note 51, p. 168.
171 Juynboll, supra note 101, p. 30. This period marks only the beginning of the concept 
of Sunnah of the Prophet as having its own content. Sunnah was a notional and abstract 
concept throughout the Caliph Umar’s reign; see Crone and Hinds, supra note 32, 
pp. 73-80.
172 The nature of this Prophetic Sunnah, according to Hallaq, was practice-based, oral, 
fluid and mixed with non-Prophetic material; see supra note 61, p. 50.
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Uthman (d. 35 AH).173 Additionally, a change in political fortunes and the 
subsequent rise of the Abbasid dynasty (132 AH), that used the concept of 
custodians of the Prophet’s Sunnah through his uncle’s cousin Abbas to 
justify and legitimise their political power, created an ever greater impetus 
for a more systematic collection of, and searching for, Sunnah in any form.174 
This, in turn, gave rise to a tạlab al-ʿilm phenomenon175 which gradually 
started to transform behaviour-practice-based regional Sunnah into written-
based ‘Sunnah’. Another factor that started to give shape to the later con-
cepts of an ‘authentic Ḥadīth’ was the partisan tensions that emerged 
within the nascent Muslim community. These brought serious schisms 
based on conflicting claims to the successorship of the Prophet’s political 
authority as well as certain theological controversies prevalent at the 
time.176
These two divergent, powerful trends resulted firstly in practice-based 
Sunnah being increasingly clad in the mantle of written-based predomi-
nantly purely Prophetic Sunnah, and secondly in the development of more 
stringent mechanisms in establishing the authenticity of written-based 
Sunnah, especially in terms of the mode of its transmission, i.e. ʿulūm 
al-isnād. The custom of reliance on regionally practice- based Sunnah was 
increasingly becoming challenged by a growing corpus of written-based 
173 The traditional classical as well as Western accounts of the arrangement and collection 
of the Qurʾān have been challenged by the Islahi school of thought in Pakistan who are 
of the view, based on careful Qurʾānic analyses and that of traditional historiographies 
such as Tabaqat of Ibn Sa’ad and Tarikh of Al-Tabari, that the Qurʾān has been arranged 
and collected by the Prophet before he died. See www.understanding-islam.org and 
www.studying-islam.org.
174 Abbott has identified a number of other specific factors which favoured the recording 
of Ḥadīth including the socio-economic ambitions of the non-Arabs attained by their 
involvement in religious sciences, the threat and fear of heresy and religious innovation 
(bidaʾah) creeping into the tradition, the firm establishment of family isnād, the expansion 
of journeys (rihlah, talab) aimed for collection of reports and of the profession of the 
warraq (book seller/publisher, the increase in student population and the progressive 
lengthening of isnād. Nabia Abbott, Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri, Quranic Commentary 
and Tradition, Vol. 2, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1967, p. 56.
175 Journeys undertaken by pious Muslims who wanted to preserve the Prophet’s words 
and put them in writing. Also referred to as rihlah. On the extent of these journeys and how 
they contributed to the development of the early Islamic written tradition, see Abbott, 
ibid., pp. 40-57.
176 The same epistemologico-methodological changes can also be observed in the science 
of Qurʾānic commentary. For more on this, see J. van Ess, Ḥadīth und Theologie, Berlin, 
1975, p. 185. 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
201
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
ALQ 26.4_f2_393-438.indd   424 7/20/2012   2:54:05 PM
 A. Duderija / Arab Law Quarterly 26 (2012) 393-437 425
Sunnah as the by-product of tạlab al-ʿilm.177 The objectives of this search 
for knowledge/ʿilm were such as to collect as much information about 
the Prophet as possible in all spheres of his life. No qualitative distinction 
between the Prophet’s role as a Messenger, judge, ethico-moral reformer, 
family man or statesman was made, and no careful consideration was given 
to the fact that this could conceptually change the nature and the scope of 
the concept of the Qurʾān and Sunnah and their interrelationship that 
existed during the first three generations.
The “epistemological promise”, to use Prof. El-Fadl’s phrase, of having 
access to the actual words of the Prophet himself in a documented form 
was much more attractive and “logical” than the regional concept of 
Sunnah. One could argue that it was considered superior to it for several 
reasons by many of those who accepted its epistemologico-methodological 
premises. Firstly, the oral and then written in nature of proliferating 
‘Sunnah’ was more tangible than one based on a vague behaviourally prac-
tical or abstract values- or objective-based concept. Secondly, written-based 
Sunnah was more voluminous as it was collected across all regions of the 
Muslim empire rather than being limited to just one area. Thirdly, it was 
more specific and dealt with a broader subject matter than a practice-based 
Sunnah, which was often based on the spirit of the Qurʾān and Sunnah 
and was more difficult to verify. Fourthly, most of the reports were claimed 
to be going back to the Prophet, while the immediate source of practice-
based Sunnah were the Successors and the practice of the community at 
the time. Fifthly, the practice of the regional community as a source of 
Sunnah was sometimes problematic because not all community practices 
were Sunnah-based so that scepticism about all of the community prac-
tices started slowly to creep in.178 Lastly, rather than relying on the general 
practice of the entire community, many of whom were ignorant of the 
complexities pertaining to the value and preservation of this newly formed 
concept of written-dependent Sunnah, one was presented with a chain/
isnād of several transmitters, many of whom were held in high esteem and 
were said to have had an unbroken ‘link’ to the Prophet himself and, as 
such, qualified as Sunnah’s custodians.
Despite this paradigm shift in the way Sunnah was becoming to be 
viewed, the broader view of Sunnah still existed throughout the second 
century. When we examine the period of founders of the personal schools 
177 Cf. Ansari, supra note 142, pp. 494-496.
178 Ibid., p. 496.
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of thought179 such as Mālik (d. 179), Auzaʾī (d. 157), Abū Ḥanafa (d.150) 
and his disciples Abū Yusuf (d. 182) and Shaibanī (d. 189) we notice that 
a qualitative, conceptual distinction between Ḥadīth and Sunnah was still 
being made”.180 In Abū Ḥanafa’s letter to Uthman al-Batti (d. 143) the 
usage of the word Sunnah only makes sense as a concept referring to “nor-
mative way of the early community as a whole”181 (rather than that of the 
Prophet himself only in the form of Ḥadīth). According to Abd al-Rahman 
b. al-Mahdi (d. 198) who, when talking about three well-established 
authorities ( fuqahā) of Muslim community at that time namely, Al-Thawrī 
(d. 161), Al-Auzaʾī (d. 157) and Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179) characterises the 
second as imam fī l-sunnah wa laysa bi-imam fī l- ḥadīth (recognised author-
ity on questions pertaining to Sunnah but not Ḥadīth) in contradistinc-
tion to the first who was authority on Ḥadīth but not on Sunnah and the 
third as authority on both Sunnah and Ḥadīth (imām fihima jami‘ān).182 
Abū Yusuf, a disciple of Abū Ḥanafa was also known as a sạ̄hib ḥadīth wa 
sạ̄hib Sunnah183 (“custodian or disposer”, lit. owner/proprietor of Ḥadīth 
and Sunnah). Ahmed Hasan in his The Early Development in Islamic Juris-
prudence notes a similar observation when he says:
. . . it is not necessary that Sunnah be always deduced and known from a Ḥadīth. Early 
texts on law show that the term Sunnah was used in a sense of the established practice 
of the Muslims claiming to have come down from the time of the Prophet. That is why 
Sunnah sometimes contradicts Ḥadīth and sometimes Ḥadīth documents it.184
Therefore, existence of Ḥadīth did not mean an a priori dispensing with 
the earlier concept of Sunnah. Moreover, as we shall subsequently argue, 
we can infer from Hasan’s above-cited statement that the practice-based 
Sunnah was used as a criterion for distilling Sunnah congruent from Sun-
nah non-congruent Ḥadīth.
179 This is the second stage in the development of madhahib; see C. Melchert, The 
Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law in the 9th-10th Centuries CE (Leiden: Brill, 1997). 
180 Dutton, supra note 51, p. 168; We have already referred to Mālik’s view of Ḥadīth-
independent Sunnah as being “normative pattern of life established by the Prophet, put 
into practice by Companions, and then inherited as ʿamal by the Successors and the 
Successors of Successors down to his time”. Cf., Ansari, supra note 54, pp. 152-157.
181 Juynboll, supra note 46, p. 104.
182 As cited in Shah Walli Allah, Al-Musawwa min Aḥadīth al-Muwatṭạ, Makkah, 1351 
AH, p. 15.
183 As cited in Goldziher, supra note 36, vol. I, p. 15.
184 A. Hasan, Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamabad, 1970, p. 87. 
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In the context of the definition of Sunnah during this time of personal 
schools of thought,185 we need to remember that there now existed two 
significant and accepted modes of its transmission, namely practical and 
Ḥadīth-based. These two modes of transmission of Sunnah were based on 
two different epistemologico-methodological foundations. The reasons for 
this were the existing and acknowledged fabrications and contradictory 
elements becoming evident during the process of formulation of written-
based Sunnah, and the possible contamination of practice-based Sunnah 
with the general practice of community. Therefore “the concern of all 
ancient [i.e. personal] schools of thought was thus to know what repre-
sented the genuine, normative Sunnah of the Prophet and his Companions”.186 
Both, according to this view, however, could embody Sunnah.
The Iraqis referred to the Sunnah which functioned as a “Sunnah filter” 
as al-sunnah al-maḥfula al-maʿrufa, the well-established Sunnah,187 and it 
was this Sunnah that was accepted as normative by the consensus of the 
majority of ʿulama referred to as ijmāʿ ”.188 Mālik ibn Anas referred to it as 
sunnah ʿindana or at times ʿamal and it acted as the final arbiter and ulti-
mate proof of the Prophetic practice.189 Some parts of this ʿamal was con-
sidered to be Sunnah whilst others were not. Guraya who investigated 
Mālik’s usage of the concept of Sunnah in his Muwatṭạ has determined the 
actual constituents of Sunnah according to Mālik as follows:
(i)  the religious and ethical principles introduced by the Prophet which, 
in due course of time, had acquired the status of recognised Islamic 
185 The regional schools of law, which represent the first stage of development of 
madhahib, were followed by a second stage of development termed ‘personal schools of law’ 
because they were founded on the authority of an individual such as Abū Ḥanafa, Mālik, 
Shāfiʿ and Ibn Ḥanbal, hence Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʾī and Ḥanbalī madhhab. The fact is 
that, in most cases, the founders of these schools of thought were actually the disciples of 
these authorities. For more, see Melchert, supra note 179.
186 Dutton, supra note 51, p. 175; Umar Faruq Abd-Allah, supra note 49, pp. 761-764.
187 Shāfiʾi, Kitāb al-ʿUmm, op. cit., p. 314; cf., Hallaq, supra note 61, p. 69.
188 Faruq Abd-Allah, supra note 49; cf., Ansari, supra note 54, pp. 155-157.
189 Ibid., p. 105; cf., Guraya, supra note 25, pp. 177-183. Schacht refers to this sunnah 
madiyya as the “living practice of ancient schools of thought” and considers it to be the 
major sources of Islamic jurisprudence in the first one and a half centuries Hijrah. For an 
excellent overview of Schacht’s understanding of the living practice, see Z. Maghen, “Dead 
Tradition: Joseph Schacht and the Origins of ‘Popular Practice’ ”, Islamic Law and Society, 
10/3 (2003) 276-347.
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religious norms and the accepted standard of conduct [al-qawāʾid 
al-kulliyyah]
  (ii) sound reason and independent considered opinion (raʾy), and
(iii) legal and moral reasoning.190
Dutton defines this Sunnah as “a generally agreed core of experience which 
constituted the community’s knowledge of what it meant to live as a 
Muslim”.191 ‘Abd Ar-Rahman ibn Mahdi (d. 198) is also reported to have 
not only made a distinction between Sunnah and Ḥadīth but was an advo-
cate of the superiority of Sunnah based on the ʿamal of Medina over that 
of Ḥadīth-based Sunnah asserting that “A preceding Sunnah from the 
Sunnah of the people of Madinah is better than Ḥadīth”.192 Similarly, the 
Ḥanafī Judge Isa b. Aban (d. 221 AH) argued that the early Muslim com-
munity had rejected ahad ḥadīth which contradicted the Qurʾān or estab-
lished Sunnah and used reason as the ultimate arbiter for judging the 
veracity of a report and not the isnād.193
The regional Sunnah we described above was, according to Rahman, 
constantly re-defined and re-crystallised based as it was on two method-
ological tools: ijtihād-qiyās (personal opinion thought to be in accordance 
with the broad, general concept of regional Sunnah termed al-sunnah 
al-maʿrufa) and ijmā‘ whose ultimate anchoring point was the Prophet.194 
The prevalence of this fundamentally same attitude to Sunnah at this time 
period is demonstrated by the fact that the bulk of Al-Shaibanī’s (d. 189) 
last work entitled Siyar al-Kābir consists of his own ijtihād. This was based 
on his scrutiny of works of earlier generations rather than any literal adher-
ence to Ḥadīth.195
As far as the use of raʾy based on ʿaql during the second century AH is 
concerned, a similar narrowing down of its legitimacy, scope and connota-
tion was starting to take place, but this process, just like in the case of 
190 Guraya, Origins, pp. 115, 119.
191 Ibid.
192 Al-Qayrawani, supra note 104, p. 26.
193 Abū Bakar al-Jassas, Usụ̄l al-Jassas, vol. 1, Muhammad Tahir, ed. (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2001) 504 ff, 2, pp. 3-6, 14.
194 Rahman, supra note 118, p. 140; cf., Calder, The Origins, p. 55.
195 Ibid. Perhaps the only notable difference is that these authorities had to deal with 
growing number of Ḥadīth and were under a growing influence of them as potentially and 
contingently (upon regional Sunnah-based criteria) embodying Sunnah but not an a priori 
acceptance.
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Sunnah, was incomplete.196 Reinhart argues that throughout the Abbasid 
era, which includes the period under question, the Islamic worldview:
. . . was complemented by religious ideology arguing that all human kind share[ed] a 
kind of moral common sense, the ʿaql, which has always enabled humans to know the 
good from detestable. In this process of trying to account for this universal knowledge, 
scholars sought to locate acts, values in the act itself and the valuation of it in the 
ʿaql . . . Muslim Revelation, consequently, was understood as a supplementary form of 
knowledge, one that confirmed ʿaql . . .197
As we previously mentioned, for example, numerous fuqahāʾ, who died 
during the second and the third decade of the second century, relied heav-
ily on exercising personal opinions based on reason/ ʿaql rather than being 
involved in Ḥadīth transmission.198 This trend was evident also among 
many second or even third century authorities who belonged to the Ahl 
al-Sunnah (or were given the title of sạ̄hib sunnah) but who were not neces-
sarily associated with proficiency and accuracy of Ḥadīth transmission.199
At the time of Ibn Al-Muqaffa (d. 140), the positive connotations of raʾy 
were still in operation although they had started to develop a negative 
connotation as well.200 As the Ḥadīth body of literature was gradually 
expanding, views not based on these now entirely textual sources of Sunnah 
increasingly started to denote ‘arbitrary opinion’ in the minds of those 
engaged in the process of written documentation of Sunnah.201 This mixed 
trend of good and bad ra’y was still evident at the time of Abū Yusuf 
(d. 182) and Shaibanī (d. 189). However, since Sunnah was increasingly 
associated with literal adherence to proliferating Ḥadīth, which were 
thematically diverse and quite comprehensive, in contrast to being 
interpreted against the background of ʿamal-based Sunnah or sunnah 
al-maʿrufah, conceptually Sunnah’s nature was becoming more edified and 
its scope was ever more narrowingly defined.
196 Rahman maintains, e.g., that Shaibani “has often recourse to istiḥsān (juristic 
preference) in opposition to earlier precedents and [that he] exercises absolute reasoning”; 
see supra note 118, p. 140.
197 Reinhart, supra note 89, p. 178.
198 Juynboll, supra note 101, pp. 36-37; cf., Crone and Hinds, supra note 32, p. 75.
199 Juynboll, supra note 46, pp. 114-116.
200 Ansari, supra note 19, p. 289; Ra’y seems to have dominated jurist thought until the 
middle of the second century; Hallaq, supra note 61, pp. 75-76; see also Ansari, supra 
note 54, p. 159.
201 Ibid.
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The growing insistence on a literal following (bi-lā kaifa) of ‘authentic 
Ḥadīth’, as the only legitimate sources and perpetuators of Sunnah, its 
superiority as a tool of Qurʾānic tafsīr (exegesis) at the cost of non-written-
based Sunnah, and reason-based opinion (raʾy) began to considerably 
narrow down the epistemologico-methodological playfield of both the 
Qurʾān and Sunnah and therefore the nature and the scope of the concept 
of Shariʿah. This methodological concept of bi-lā kaifa (literally ‘without 
asking how’) was based on the premise that whatever is written in the 
Qurʾān as well as in ‘authentic Ḥadīth’ is not allowed to be contextualised, 
interpreted in a metaphorical sense or based on certain non-textual 
epistemological and methodological tools such as notion of ethical 
objectivism, the use of reason or concept of the spirit and rationale (qasd ) 
of the Qurʾān and Sunnah which were, as we saw earlier, the foundation of 
Qurʾānic and Sunnahic teachings as characterised by the Prophet’s 
embodiment of the Qurʾānic message put into practice and perpetuated by 
the first three generations of Muslims.
A significant impetus to this view of the epistemologico-methodological 
superiority of Ḥadīth-based Sunnah to that of al-sunnah al-maʿrufah was 
provided by Shāfiʿī who belonged to the fourth generation of Muslims.
3.2.2.4. Sunnah at the Time of Shāfiʿī and Beyond 
In the previous part of our discussion we alluded generally to the forces 
which were contributing towards the growth of the written recordings of 
(reportedly) Prophet’s actions and words and the absorption of non-
written-based Sunnah into them. We also saw that a broader and narrower 
version of Sunnah were co-existent with an increased tendency for ‘Ḥadīth-
ification’ of regional Sunnah. We shall refer to these factors as mechanisms 
of traditionalisation. Calder describes this process as a transition from a 
discursive tradition to a hermeneutic tradition (purporting to derive the 
law exegetically from the Prophetic sources).202 Ansari, similarly, talks in 
terms of the shift towards “an objectively justifiable juristic theory” at the 
time of Shāfiʿī.203 Therefore, those religious authorities that fully embraced 
and adhered to this narrower epistemologico- methodologal definition of 
Sunnah (Sunnah equals ‘authentic Ḥadīth’) are conventionally referred to 
202 Norman Calder, Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 
1993, p. 8. He also suggests, in the same sentence, that this process “was a lengthy and 
complex one”.
203 Ansari, supra note 142; O. Shafi’I, see infra.
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as traditionalists (Ahl al-Ḥadīth) while others who remained faithful to the 
broader definition of Sunnah, which included an element of raʾy, were 
given the title of rationalists (Ahl al-Raʾy).204
The increasing epistemologico-methodological constraints on Sunnah 
emerged as a by-product of this traditionalisation towards the end and the 
beginning of the second century with the process of systematic collection 
and criticism of Ḥadīth.205 These efforts bore fruit in form of the collection 
of large quantities of purely written-based ‘Sunnah’ that were claimed to 
have originated from the very mouth of the Prophet. This ‘Sunnah’, 
although originally oral in nature was in due course completely written-
based and came from every corner of the Muslim empire.206 Its authenticity 
was guaranteed by an increasingly ‘healthier’ isnāds as developed by 
muḥadīthiūn.207 The champion of this definition of ‘Sunnah’ was the 
famous jurist Shāfi‘ī (d. 204). Shāfiʿī’s concept of Sunnah was:
Established by traditions going back to the Prophet, not by practice or consensus. 
[Apart] from a few traces of the idea of al-sunnah al-maʿrufah in his earlier writings, 
Shāfiʿī recognises the ‘Sunnah of the Prophet’ only in so far as it is expressed in 
traditions going back to him.208 This is the idea of Sunnah we find in the classical 
theory of Muhammadan laws, and Shāfiʿī must be considered as its originator there . . . 
Shāfiʿī restricts the meaning of Sunnah so much to the contents of traditions from the 
prophet, that he is inclined to identify both terms more or less completely.209
Thus, it was with Shāfiʿī, a member of the fourth generation of Muslims, 
that the methodologico-epistemological beginnings of the coalescing of 
Sunnah with Ḥadīth came into being for the first time. Up to this point in 
time, prevalent ethico-religious character of Sunnah being interpreted, 
204 For more, see Melchert, supra note 179.
205 In Juynboll we read that the beginning of Ḥadīth standardisation in terms of isnād 
occurred during the last two to three decades of the first century Hijrah; see supra note 101, 
pp. 19-22. 
206 In Muslim literature, this is referred to as talab al-ḥadīth, i.e. journeys made by 
individuals seeking and collecting the sayings of the Prophet; see, e.g., Goldziher, supra 
note 36, Ch. 6, pp. 164-181; also Juynboll, supra note 101, pp. 66-70.
207 I.e., those who were engaged in compilation, classification and criticism of Ḥadīth 
and its authenticity.
208 In opposition to those who stopped at the level of Companions—these were and still 
are acceptable in Ḥanafī madhhab; for more, see A. Zysow, The Economy of Certainty: An 
Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory, Harvard University, Ph.D. Dissertation, 
1984, pp. 61-67.
209 Schacht, supra note 86, p. 77.
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crystallising and re-interpreted by the fuqahāʾ in the light of ʿamal was 
becoming ever more legalistic and written in nature. The fuqahāʾ of the 
regional and personal schools of law (as we briefly outlined and shall deal 
with in more detail in the next part of the study on Ḥadīth-dependent 
Sunnah) developed their own hermeneutic of Sunnahic definition and 
interpretation based on their broader hermeneutic orientation which, in 
the eyes of Ahl al-Ḥadīth, suffered from numerous defects.210 As such, 
Shāfiʿī often accused these fuqahāʾ, such as Abū Yusuf and Mālik, of 
ignoring or interpreting away the Ḥadīth in favour of their own school’s 
doctrine or that of their own raʾy.211
A fāqih who belonged to a personal school of law was increasingly 
presented with a dilemma either of following the school’s doctrine of 
Sunnahic hermeneutic or that of Shāfiʿī.212 A dilemma was made much 
more difficult if the fāqih had to judge a case that did not have a direct 
precedent in his school’s doctrine but was found in an isolated213 Ḥadīth 
going back to the Prophet pertaining to the matter at hand, or if these two 
legal tools were contradictory.
Rather than opting for acceptance of a ‘raw’ Ḥadīth unknown to 
previous authorities belonging to same school, the majority of fuqahāʾ 
belonging to a particular school of thought, especially those of lower status, 
were faithful and obedient (muqallid ) to their school’s hermeneutic.214 In 
discussing this, Brown astutely observes that, with the exception of 
Ḥanbalism, the theoretical triumph of the Shāfiʿī’s concept of Sunnah 
affected the personal schools of law only “peripherally”. The allegiance to 
the school’s doctrine of legal theory, he further maintains, was based on 
210 See Calder, Origins, Ch. 9, on the development of hermeneutical skills in various 
schools of thought.
211 See, e.g., Schacht, supra note 86, pp. 58-80.
212 For a detailed discussion on this, see B. Sadeghi, The Structure of Reasoning in Post-
Formative Islamic Jurisprudence, Ph.D. Thesis, Princetown University, 2006.
213 A report that was transmitted by one or only few individuals in contrast to mutawātir 
ḥadīth which was transmitted by a large number of narrators. See below for a more detailed 
definition of isolated (ahad ) and successive (mutawātir) Ḥadīths.
214 For example, schools of thought/law gained high prestige in society and were awarded 
a great deal of authority and reverence to their founding fathers; for an exhaustive analysis 
of this subject, see W. Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) cf., Sadeghi, The Structure of Reasoning in Post-Formative 
Islamic Jurisprudence.
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consensus215 as the ultimate criterion in its decision-making processes and 
not on the Ḥadīth.216 For example, Abū Yusuf, Shāfiʿī’s older contemporary, 
is quoted as having said:
So make the Qurʾān and well-known Sunnah (al-sunnah al-maʿrufah) your imam and 
guide. Follow and judge on that basis whatever maters come to you that have not been 
clarified for you in the Qurʾān and Sunnah . . .
adding:
So beware of irregular (shadhdh) Ḥadīth and go by those Ḥadīth, which are accepted 
by the community and recognised by, the fuqahāʾ [as valid] and which are in accor-
dance with the Qurʾān and Sunnah. Judge matters on that basis”.217
Thus this “sunnaic-concensual practice”, to use Hallaq’s terminology that 
was considered binding was seen as “determinative of Ḥadīth”.218
As Brown writes, these personal schools of thought (madhahib)219 “had 
given assent in theory to the importance of Ḥadīth whilst resisting its 
thorough application” creating a tension between Shāfiʿī’s definition of 
Sunnah and “the actual doctrine of the madhhab”.220 The consolidating 
Ahl al-Ḥadīth movement, however, increasingly questioned these practices 
as being un-Sunnahic, throwing the doors wide-open for the concept of 
ihy al-sunnah, revivification of and return to Prophetic Sunnah, by means 
of a literal adherence to ‘authentic Ḥadīth’ without any intermediaries.
Shāfiʿī’s methodological innovation did not only pertain to Sunnah but 
also to the entire evolving legal theory. To him is attributed the title of the 
215 This consensus should not be confused with the later definition of it in form of ijmāʿ 
but should be understood in terms of the agreed living practice constituting Sunnah. Cf. 
Hallaq, supra note 61, pp. 110-112.
216 Brown, supra note 2, p. 20. 
217 Abū Yusuf, Siyar al-Awzaʾī, as cited in Yasin Dutton, The Origins of Islamic Law -The 
Qurʾan, the Muwatta and Madinian ‘Amal (Routledge, Curzon), 2002, p. 175; cf., Ansari, 
supra note 142, p. 497.
218 Hallaq, supra note 61, p. 110.
219 For the sake of simplicity, madhhab is rendered here as schools of thought/law. For its 
various definitions and evolution, see Melchert, “Introduction”, supra note 179.
220 Brown, supra note 2, p. 20.
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first scholar to develop a systematic model of law derivation, and in many 
ways he was considered a father of Islamic jurisprudence.221
The efforts of Shāfiʿī to systematise and develop a more coherent model 
of legal theory by making Ḥadīth the only vehicle of perpetuation and sole 
repository of Sunnah, supported by Ahl al-Ḥadīth, resulted in the further 
consolidation222 of existing personal schools of law such as the Mālikī, 
Ḥanafī and later on development of Shāfiʿī and Ahl al-Ḥadīth madhhabs.
Shāfiʿī’s hierarchical legal theory set up for purposes of defining the epis-
temological boundaries and methodological procedures for derivation of 
positive law was, apart from the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth-based Sunnah, 
founded on ijmaʾ and on qiyas.223 The increasingly hierarchical structure of 
this entirely textual hermeneutic (the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth) meant, how-
ever, that non-textual sources (practice-based Sunnah/well-known Sun-
nah, abstract ethico-moral principles, ijmāʿ and analogy) were largely 
displaced and constrained by them. In relation to this phenomenon 
Wheeler asserts:
By defining the revelation as a text that requires interpretation as epitomized by 
prophetic practice contained in the textual corpus of the Sunnah, the theories 
associated with Shāfiʿī shifted the guarantee of the local authorities’ opinions away 
from the local definitions of traditional practice and toward a notion of authority 
based on the transmission and interpretation of texts.224
Writing about this epistemologico-methodological shift, Rahman comments 
that while in earlier times of the Companions the use of ijtihād slowly 
crystallised in consensus, giving rise to al-sunnah al-maʿrufah (well-known 
Sunnah), only to be again abolished and re-formulated in the light of new 
circumstances, the epistemological value of ijtihād was reversed in the 
post-Shāfiʿī period so that ijtihād was significantly constrained by the ijmāʿ 
221 For a more detailed account of this, see Hallaq, supra note 4, pp. 21-29. For an 
exhaustive study of Shāfiʿī’s usụ̄l al-fiqh approach, see J. Lowry, The Development of Early 
Islamic Jurisprudence (Shāfiʿī’s Kitab al-Umm), (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
222 I.e., Shāfiʿī’s more systematic approach to law provided an impetus for the existent 
schools of law to develop their own hermeneutic that was more coherent, hierarchical and 
systematic in nature.
223 For a critique of this view, see J. Lowry, “Does Shāfiʿī have a Theory of Four Sources 
of Law”, in: Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, B. Weiss, ed., pp. 23-50. For the critique of the 
critique, see ibid., pp. 389-391.
224 Wheeler, supra note 55, p. 18.
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principle.225 All this contributed to “the conviction becom[ing] absolute 
that law is justified only if it can be related hermeneutically to Prophetic 
example, and not if it is presented discursively as emanating from an 
ongoing juristic tradition.226 This, of course, is directly related to the fact 
that the epistemologico-methodologically broader concept of Sunnah 
prevailed and was considered superior to Ḥadīth during the formative 
period of Islamic thought.
The coalescing of concepts of Sunnah with “authentic Ḥadīth” in theory 
was, to a large extent, clearly evident but not fully complete at time of 
Shāfiʿī.227 The person who is to be accredited with this is one of the main 
proponents of Ahl al-Ḥadīth Sunnahic hermeneutic, Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal 
(d. 241 AH).228 His approach to the concept of Sunnah is clearly 
demonstrated in his treatise Tabagatul-Ḥanbalah 229 in which he states: 
“And the Sunnah with us are the āthār 230 (narrations) of the Prophet” (wa 
l-sunnatu ‘indana atharu rasulillah). Moreover, in terms of epistemologico-
methodological value and interpretational tool of Ḥadīth, Ḥanbal 
maintains that: “the Sunnah (i.e. athār/ḥadīth) explains and clarifies the 
Qurʾān (wa l-sunnatu231 tufassir al-qurʾān) . . . there is no analogical reason-
ing in the Sunnah and the examples are not to be made for it” (wa laisa fī 
l-sunnati qiyās, wa lā tudhrabu laha l-amthal ).
Nor is it [Sunnah] grasped and comprehended by the intellects or the 
desires (wa lā tudraka bi-l-ʿuquli wa lā l-ahwa’  )”.232 Thus, Sunnah was 
epistemologically and methodologically self-identified with ḥadīth/athār 
and was considered as supreme commentary upon the already earlier 
discussed deutungsbeduerfigkeit of the Qurʾān.233
225 Rahman, supra note 118, pp. 145-146.
226 Calder, Origins, p. 19.
227 Making a distinction between the Shāfiʿī and Ahl al-Ḥadīth madhhab speaks for itself 
regarding this fact.
228 Watt, supra note 9, p. 296; also see A. Ibn Ḥanbal, Foundations of Sunnah, (tr.) 
Amjad ibn Muhammad Rafiq, (Birmingham: Salafi Publications, 2003). 
229 This treaty is found in or attributed to A. Ibn Ḥanbal, The Foundations of the Sunnah, 
A. ibn M. Rafiq (Eng. tr.) (Birmingham: Salafi Publications, 2003).
230 Athār is usually a synonym for Ḥadīth, going back to the timer of the Prophet but 
also to the Companions; see Ansari, supra note 19, p. 256. 
231 The word Sunnah is used here rather than Ḥadīth but given the previous statement 
it is to be understood in the sense of athār/ḥadīth.
232 As cited in Ibn Ḥanbal, The Sunnah, pp. 11-12.
233 See the first page of this article.
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Since the Ahl al-Ḥadīth movement, unlike other schools of thought, 
considered both theological and jurisprudential sciences based on both 
Qurʾānic and Sunnahic interpretation completely dependable on literal, 
Ḥadīth-based Sunnah devoid of imput of reason, Hourani maintains that 
the inherently Qurʾānic principles of ethical objectivism and partial 
rationalism were transformed into ethical volunterism (ethical concepts 
understood only in terms of God’s will)234 and traditionalism (humans can 
never know what is morally right by independent reason, but only by 
revelation and derived sources),235 thereby changing the epistemologico-
methodological character of both the Qurʾān and Sunnah.236 In this 
context, Reinhart asserts that “[At] this point in time Islam itself became 
the standard and the congruence of reason and religion, which once served 
to justify religion, now, at best, justified reason”.237 Furthermore, the 
overriding principles of textual hermeneutic also meant “Revelation must 
categorically alter morality and epistemology . . .” and by inference “[B]efore 
or without Revelation there can be no moral knowledge”.238
4. Conclusion
At the beginning of this article, two questions that guided its analyses were 
asked: namely whether the traditional definition of Sunnah that took root 
and established itself during the post-formative or classical period of 
Islamic thought reflect the way this term was understood during the pre-
classical period. The answer, based on our above analyses is a clear ‘no’. We 
have seen that over a period of some 250 years Sunnah was semantico-
contextually and epistemologico-methodologically fluid. Secondly, this 
article has attempted to explain which mechanisms were responsible for its 
conflation with an authentic Ḥadīth as defined by the classical ʿulūm 
al-ḥadīth sciences and when they became apparent. From the above 
chronological analyses of the concept of Sunnah we can conclude the 
234 God’s will, however, is always subject to the interpretation of those who engage in 
deducing meaning from the text; El-Fadl, Speaking, pp. 115-132.
235 There was a degree or variation on these issues between different as well as within 
schools of thought. For an exhaustive discussion on this issue, see Reinhart, supra note 89, 
pp. 11-37.
236 Hourani, supra note 58, pp. 2-3.
237 Reinhart, supra note 89, p. 178.
238 Ibid., p. 183.
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following. At the time of the Prophet and the first three to four generations 
of Muslims, the Qurʾān and Sunnah, in terms of their nature and scope, 
were conceptually seen as one organic whole. In addition to the ʿibadah 
dimension of Sunnah both of these sources of Islamic thought were 
primarily seen in ethico-religious and objective or values-based concepts 
and were reason inclusive. All these aspects of Sunnah could be formulated, 
preserved and transmitted orally. The concept of Sunnah was conceptually 
differentiated from that of Ḥadīth may it be in a form of sunnah al-maʿrufah 
or that of sunnah madiyyah. With the process of what we have described as 
traditionalisation, this concept of the nature and the scope of the concept 
of Sunnah (and that of the Qurʾān) underwent important conceptual 
changes. Severance of the symbiotic link between the Qurʾān and Sunnah 
occurred, and, over time, its hermeneutical dependence on Ḥadīth-based 
literature was largely engendered, thus changing conceptually its nature 
and scope as it was understood during the first three generations of 
Muslims.239 Secondly, the nature and the scope of the concept of Sunnah 
was conceptually distorted and conflated with the concept of ‘a post-Shāfiʿī 
authentic Ḥadīth’ which is how the contemporary Islamic majority 
mainstream thought continues to conceptualise it to this day.
239 For more on this see, Duderija, “Methodology”, supra note 7.
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